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"We were squashing the pyramid down to a flat plain in which in-
formation could come from any particular place at any time. And
governments were no longer in control of their information."'
INTRODUCTION
The outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002-
2003 and Swine Flu (HINI) in 2009 captured a great deal of global atten-
tion. The swift spread of these diseases wreaked havoc, generated public
hysteria, disrupted global trade and travel, and inflicted severe economic
losses to countries, corporations, and individuals. Although affected states
were required to report to the World Health Organization (WHO) events that
may have constituted a public health emergency, many failed to do so.' The
WHO and the rest of the international community were therefore desperate
for accurate, up-to-date information as to the nature of the pandemics, their
spread in different countries, and treatment possibilities.
The solution came from a somewhat surprising source-the internet.
The first signs of both diseases were discovered by automated web crawlers3
that screened local media sources in multiple languages, looking for specific
keywords. In the case of SARS, a web crawler reported to the WHO about
the early signs of the disease more than three months before the internation-
al community became aware of it.4 In the case of Swine Flu, a web crawler
was similarly responsible for unearthing early reports on the disease and
triggering further inquiry by the WHO.' Information that flew from the in-
ternet impelled the WHO to approach local health agencies and demand that
they conduct thorough investigations into the outbreaks.
The role played by the internet expanded even further after the initial
discovery of the diseases. The worldwide spread of SARS and, in particular,
Swine Flu was closely monitored online by global networks of scientists and
volunteers who shared their experiences and tagged relevant data on interac-
tive maps. As the Director-General of the WHO declared, "[flor the first
time in history, the international community could watch a pandemic unfold,
and chart its evolution, in real time.' 6
I. Eric Mykhalovskiy & Lorna Weir, The Global Public Health Intelligence Network
and Early Warning Outbreak Detection: A Canadian Contribution to Global Public Health, 97
CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH 42, 43-44 (2006) (quoting a member of the Global Public Health Intel-
ligence Network [GPHIN]).
2. See discussion infra Part II.A.
3. A web crawler is a software program that browses the internet in a methodical and
automated manner, looking for predefined keywords. For more information, see generally
infra discussion accompanying notes 162-186.
4. See infra discussion accompanying notes 188-198.
5. See infra discussion accompanying notes 199-212.
6. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] DIRECTOR-GENERAL, PROGRESS IN PUB-
LIC HEALTH DURING THE PREVIOUS DECADE AND MAJOR CHALLENGES AHEAD: REPORT BY
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AT ITS 126TH SESSION (2010) (by Dr.
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This Article argues that these technological developments are not just
helpful for better disease detection and surveillance, but rather, they reflect a
deeper, broader conceptual shift in state compliance with international law.
Information technologies allow international organizations (1Os) to play an
unprecedented, and so far overlooked, role in this respect. In particular, they
transform one of the core functions of lOs in international relations: compli-
ance monitoring.
As compliance monitors, 1Os serve as information clearinghouses-
they collect data on state compliance and disseminate it to third-party states,
international nongovernment organizations, or domestic groups. The latter
can then use this information to influence the behavior of violating states or
support the efforts of complying states (for example, by demanding domes-
tic public health investigations). However, in many cases, 1Os' access to
compliance information is limited. As a result, they cannot properly perform
their monitoring functions and the effectiveness of international regulation is
undermined. Information technologies change this reality.
Theories of internet and democracy have celebrated the potential of the
internet to begin a new era of governmental transparency and accountability,
creating effective channels of communication between government and civil
society.7 However, as of now, 1Os have not been on the agenda of the trans-
parency movement, and the burgeoning internet literature has largely
ignored them. Although some 1Os have been consistently using information
technologies as part of their monitoring efforts in the past decade, a system-
atic analysis of these endeavors has been missing and a coherent policy
prescription is yet to be developed. Given the gravity of the compliance
monitoring challenge, this void begs to be filled.
Focusing on the international regulation of health, environment, and
human rights, this Article explores the changes brought by information
technologies to the contested field of state compliance with international
law. The Article argues that by enhancing the monitoring capacities of
1Os, information technologies can strengthen state compliance and im-
prove the efficacy of international regulation. Not only can the internet
amplify the amount of the available compliance information, it can also
improve its substance. However, as this Article demonstrates, the use of
the internet for monitoring purposes may also raise challenges and trigger
Margaret Chan), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/20 10/executiveboard_126_20100118/
en/index.html.
7. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUC-
TION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212-72 (2006); BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER (2003);
ANDREW CHADWICK, INTERNET POLITICS: STATES, CITIZENS, AND NEW COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES (2006); STEPHEN COLEMAN & JAY G. BLUMLER, THE INTERNET AND DEMO-
CRATIC CITIZENSHIP: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY (2009); DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE
PROSPECTS OF POLITICAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE INTERNET (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004); A.
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116
HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003); Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital Technology and
Local Democracy in America, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1413 (2011).
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adverse reactions. In fact, it may turn 1Os into the wardens of Foucauldian
"panopticons, ' '8 who can at any time inspect state behavior without the
state's consent or awareness that it is being watched. This Article examines
the normative implications of this novel phenomenon and offers a legal
framework that mitigates the negative aspects of the "panopticon" while
preserving the desirable ones.
Part I discusses the compliance challenge in international law and
explains the monitoring functions of 1Os. Part II delves into the details of
compliance monitoring within three international regulatory regimes 9 -
health, environment, and human rights-and demonstrates its current
ineffectiveness. Part III explores the promise of new information technolo-
gies for compliance monitoring by 1Os. It first examines the access to
information policies employed by 1Os and discusses their implications. It
then focuses on the use of information technologies by the WHO, and sug-
gests similar strategies in the context of international environmental and
human rights regulation. Part IV explores the implications of information
technologies for compliance monitoring by 1Os. It discusses the empower-
ment of 1Os and the likely countermeasures of the monitored states. Lastly,
it suggests several normative proposals that could facilitate the smooth
adoption of information technologies for purposes of compliance monitor-
ing.
1. THE COMPLIANCE CHALLENGE
State compliance with international obligations has been one of the
most persistent challenges of international law.'° "The absence of a central-
ized enforcement authority" has been regarded as "a crucial and distinctive
deficiency"" of international law, raising the question of why governments
would honor obligations that do not reflect their interests. A plethora of the-
ories in international law and international relations tackle this challenge
from a variety of angles. This Part first surveys the major theories of corn-
8. See generally infra notes 250-253 and accompanying text. I am grateful to Profes-
sor Sheila Jasanoff for referring me to the "panopticon" metaphor.
9. An international regime can be defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area." Stephen
D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,
in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
10. Compliance is defined as "a state of conformity or identity between an actor's be-
havior and a specified rule." Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law,
International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538,
539 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). The literature discusses several dimensions of com-
pliance: compliance with procedural obligations (e.g., submitting reports), compliance with
substantive obligations under an international agreement, and compliance with the spirit of the
agreement. See ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1,4 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998).
11. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitu-
tional Law, Public Law, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1791, 1823 (2009).
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pliance in international law and then examines the role of 1Os in the compli-
ance framework.
A. Why Do States Obey International Law?
Theories of international relations widely differ in their answers to the
question of why states obey international law. The realist tradition adheres
to the belief that international law simply reflects the existing distribution of
power among states. According to this vision, international law provides
powerful nations with flexible tools to pursue their self-interests and exer-
cise control over the international agenda, leaving less powerful states
unprotected. 12 International law therefore utilizes two separate regimes of
compliance. Powerful nations "can violate the rights of a small nation with-
out having to fear effective sanctions on the latter's part."'13 At the same
time, small nations cannot influence the international agenda but have to
comply with obligations that are imposed on them by others.'4 A variation
on this approach suggests that compliance with international obligations
does not reflect politics of power, but is rather the result of a mere coinci-
dence of interests. Compliance is thus understood as incidental-"nations
doing what they would have done anyhow, in the absence of law." 5 Hence,
international regulatory regimes that achieve high compliance rates do not
indicate the effectiveness of a treaty, but rather represent shallow commit-
ments that nations would undertake either with or without the treaty in
place. 16
Functionalist (also known as "institutionalist") scholars take a differ-
ent stance on international compliance. This body of literature suggests
that states are willing to compromise their short-term self-interest and
comply with international obligations in order to achieve their larger long-
term goals.'7 Under this vision, 1Os establish the terms for cooperation and
12. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 270-71 (2d ed. 1954); John
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT'L SECURITY, Winter
1994/1995, at 5, 7.
13. MORGENTHAU, supra note 12, at 271.
14. Goldsmith and Levinson mention several examples of such "power politics": anti-
proliferation regimes that allow states holding nuclear weapons to preserve them but prohibit
other states from obtaining them; intellectual property agreements that favor First World
states; the U.N. Charter that grants veto powers to powerful states. See Goldsmith & Levinson,
supra note 11, at 1825.
15. Id. at 1825-26; JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 27-28 (2005); MORGENTHAU, supra note 12, at 271-72.
16. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News
About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 382-83 (1996). Examples of such commitments
include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Mine Ban Treaty. See Goldsmith & Levin-
son, supra note 11, at 1826.
17. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 7-10 (1984); Robert 0. Keo-
hane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L SECURITY 39, 41-42
(1995); James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution
Versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387, 387-88 (1994).
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coordination among nations. As part of this process, international obliga-
tions turn into effective "self-enforcing" mechanisms without requiring a
centralized enforcement body because nations share a common long-term
interest that is reflected in the regime's provisions. 8 Compliance is therefore
explained "by the ability to structure incentives in such a way as to make
noncompliance too costly to consider."' 9
While realist and functionalist approaches to compliance with interna-
tional law reach different conclusions, they share a similar basis-both
perceive international relations in an instrumental manner. According to both,
states engage in international regimes and comply with international obliga-
tions only when "the perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.""°
However, this understanding of international relations is not uncontested.
Constructivism, another influential tradition in international relations, takes
a different path by asserting that state behavior is shaped by international
norms and structures, and not vice versa. Constructivists argue that the in-
ternational system in fact precedes state behavior, "shap[ing] the policies of
nations and limit[ing] national behavior."2' States operate within certain
"givens" of the international system (e.g., nationhood, sovereignty, territori-
ality, recognition), rather than pursue their short- or long-term interests. 22
Operating within these "givens," international regulatory regimes generate
and inculcate norms of proper behavior that affect state conduct through
processes of persuasion, norm internalization, or acculturation.2 3 State com-
pliance is therefore seen "as a product of the normative force of
international law and its ability to shape the interests and values of states."24
18. For instance, the rules developed by the World Trade Organization are largely ob-
served, even if they are not backed by enforcement mechanisms and violate the immediate
interests of some of the parties, because states share an ongoing long-term interest in free
trade. Other examples include the customary laws of war, the law of the sea, extradition, dip-
lomatic immunity, investment, and arms control. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 1I, at
1827; see also BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 117 (2009).
19. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 118.
20. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 11, at 1828.
21. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 22 (2d ed. 1979).
22. Id. at 15-17.
23. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
128-49 (1996) (evaluating constructive norms that "constitute, create, or revise" other ration-
ales, like realism and institutionalism, for state compliance with international obligations);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3-26 (1990) (focusing on
specific historical events and addressing why "powerless states obey powerless rules"); JOHN
GERARD RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITU-
TIONALIZATION 11-39 (1998); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 46-190 (1999); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socializa-
tion and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626-30, 667-74 (2004)
(building upon constructivism and developing a new theory of acculturation, which is primari-
ly concerned with social compliance mechanisms such as assimilation); Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2633-34 (1997).
24. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 11, at 1830.
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B. International Organizations and Compliance Monitoring
The role of lOs in the compliance game varies from one theory of inter-
national relations to another. For realists, lOs are "arenas for acting out
power relationships."25 They reflect and enhance state power and interests,
and lack the capacity to independently affect state behavior.26 While this
observation may be accurate at times, it lacks full explanatory force: If gov-
ernments are indeed not constrained by lOs, why do they waste time and
other resources on intense bargaining over them?2 7
The functionalist approach answers this question, suggesting that 1Os
are important because they allow states "to overcome problems of collective
action, high transactions costs and information deficits or asymmetries. 2 8
As part of this state-centric vision, lOs are regarded as islands of coopera-
tion and coordination that are necessary in order to solve problems of
cooperation between nations.2 9 A central function of lOs in this respect is
that they facilitate reciprocity, "enabling states to use carrots and sticks on
each other," and credibly build their international reputation. 30 Reciprocity
and reputation are therefore regarded as two mechanisms by which 1Os con-
strain and alter state behavior. 3'
lOs are similarly important for the constructivist tradition of interna-
tional relations. According to this approach, lOs are a major vehicle for the
systematic development, dissemination, and inculcation of shared interna-
tional norms and knowledge. 32 Serving as "chief socializing agent[s], 3 3 lOs
25. Tony Evans & Peter Wilson, Regime Theory and the English School of International
Relations: A Comparison, 21 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 329, 330 (1992).
26. Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations and Institutions,
in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 10, at 192, 195; see, e.g., MORGEN-
THAU, supra note 12, at 301-02; KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
117-23 (1979); Mearsheimer, supra note 12, at 7; see also JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 29-32 (2005).
27. Simmons & Martin, supra note 26, at 195.
28. Id. For an overview of functionalist theory, see generally ALVAREZ, supra note 26,
at 17-29.
29. Simmons & Martin, supra note 26, at 195.
30. XINYUAN DAI, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL POLICIES 17 (2007).
31. Id.; see, e.g., Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 226, 249-51 (Ken-
neth A. Oye ed., 1986); Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral
Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 INT'L ORG. 73, 86-87 (2000); Keo-
hane & Martin, supra note 17, at 44-46. For more information on the relationship between
reciprocity and cooperative behavior in international relations, see generally ROBERT AXEL-
ROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY, supra;
Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 85 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 701 (1991).
32. See ALVAREZ, supra note 26, at 43-45; see, e.g., FINNEMORE, supra note 23, at 3;
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NET-
WORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
33. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 902 (1998).
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can "alter the identities and interests of states, as a result of their interactions
over time within the auspices of a set of rules.
34
A common thread in the functionalist and constructivist traditions is
that they both assign 1Os a central role in international regulation and en-
trust them with meaningful duties. 35 Specifically, a major responsibility of
1Os is the monitoring of and collection of information on state compliance
with international obligations. Under this framework, 1Os are supposed to
perform the role of information clearinghouses. They often do not enforce
legal obligations on their own, 36 but rather aggregate compliance-related
data that flows from various sources. Then they rely on the information to
"name and shame" violators and disseminate it to other international or do-
mestic actors.3" Third-party states may use this information to punish
defectors and reward cooperators, relying on the reciprocity and reputation
mechanisms of international regulatory regimes.38 Nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and domestic advocacy groups may rely on the data in order
to put pressure on legislators or use it in court proceedings.39 While monitor-
ing is particularly important under the functionalist tradition, it also plays a
major role under the constructivist vision. Information on state compliance
is necessary for purposes of knowledge sharing and norm diffusion and in
order to empower domestic groups and NGOs that may use the information
to promote their own agendas.
41
Compliance monitoring is therefore a necessary ingredient of any inter-
national regulatory regime.4I However, it is far from an easy task. Effective
monitoring "requires a continuing flow of information on the parties' per-
formance of their treaty obligations and on the general situation in the
regime's field of operation."4 In practice, 1Os can hardly ensure such flow
of information. Independent data collection often proves costly and overly
intrusive. 43 Hence, in order to fulfill their monitoring duties, 1Os rely on two
34. Simmons & Martin, supra note 26, at 198.
35. See DAI, supra note 30, at 17-18.
36. DAI, supra note 30, at 50-53. Notable examples of lOs that do possess an enforce-
ment authority are the International Monetary Fund and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty
regime. See id.
37. For a related view of international institutions, see id. at 3; Songying Fang, The
Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI.
304 (2008).
38. DAI, supra note 30, at 20-23.
39. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 127-39; see discussion infra Part II.C. For the influence
of domestic groups on international regulation, see generally Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice
in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167 (1999).
40. See DAI, supra note 30, at 19; Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 33, at 902-04.
41. For a thorough analysis of how and why monitoring arrangements are being adopt-
ed in different international regimes, see DAI, supra note 30, at 33-38.
42. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-




major sources: self-reports provided by member states, and information
produced by nongovernmental entities.
1. Self-Reporting
Self-reporting by states is the central means of compliance monitoring
that is currently employed by 1Os. The general purpose of such reporting is
"to generate information about the policies and activities of parties to the
treaty that involve treaty compliance and regime efficacy.' However, while
the primary function of self-reporting is informational, it can also serve oth-
er purposes. For example, in cases where states are genuinely interested in
implementing certain international obligations, reporting requirements may
encourage self-examination and domestic policy reforms. Reports may also
serve as effective vehicles for norms diffusion-allowing domestic actors to
learn about novel policies or helpful technological solutions.45 Additionally,
reporting can help detect authentic compliance difficulties, flesh out scien-
tific or political challenges, and assess the practical success of the regime.46
However, as justly questioned by Chayes and Chayes, "[w]hy would a
state report information that shows it to be out of compliance with its obli-
gations?"47 Self-reporting, as a way to monitor compliance, has indeed
many reasons to fail-states may not submit reports or may provide inaccu-
rate, incomplete, or unreliable information. 8 Some states would not provide
the required compliance data in order to avoid the potentially high reputa-
tion costs of public noncompliance (for example, in cases when a state
bluntly violates its treaty obligations). Others, in particular developing na-
tions, may not possess the financial and bureaucratic means that are required
in order to prepare comprehensive and reliable reports (particularly in cases
in which information collection and analysis are costly). As self-reporting
cannot reliably guarantee that states will indeed issue comprehensive reports
about their compliance situation, 1Os seek alternative monitoring methods
and turn to nongovernmental entities.
44. Id.
45. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 239 (2010).
46. Id.; CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 42, at 155.
47. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 42, at 155.
48. Id. at 155-66; DAI, supra note 30, at 58. For instance, in the context of environmen-
tal regulation, a survey conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office demonstrated that
only twenty-three percent of the parties to the major environmental treaties filed any report in
1990. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 42, at 156. A survey conducted by the U.N. Secretary-
General in 1992 revealed similar findings. Of the 164 member parties to the major human
rights conventions, nearly all were lagging behind on at least one compliance report and most
on several. DAI, supra note 30, at 58.
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2. Information Produced by Nongovernmental Entities
Due to the deficiencies of self-reporting and the costliness of centralized
data collection, most lOs substantially rely on compliance information pro-
duced by NGOs.4 9 The shape and scope of NGOs' activity with regard to
compliance monitoring substantially differs from one organization to anoth-
er. Some NGOs may embark on ambitious fact-finding missions and report
unique findings and first-hand evidence to 1Os. Some may aggregate and
convey to lOs data that has been held by domestic groups. Others may eval-
uate state reports and draw the attention of lOs to internal inconsistencies or
misreporting.
While reports produced by NGOs offer a precious source of compliance
information, they can hardly replace other monitoring endeavors. Compli-
ance monitoring by NGOs is often not sufficiently comprehensive,
systematic, or neutral, as their efforts are focused on certain issues, particu-
lar instances of noncompliance, or specific states.50 As Philip Alston
explains, "this goes to the very nature of NGOs. They are political organisa-
tions in the sense that the heart-felt advocacy of specific policies is their
very raison d'tre.' '51 Hence, as NGOs operate under independent agendas
that are not necessarily aligned with the interests of official 1Os, their con-
tributions can complement but cannot substitute for the monitoring
functions of 1Os.
In sum, while the monitoring of and collection of information on state
compliance is an important function of 1Os and a necessary component of
international regulatory regimes, 1Os do not possess effective means to per-
form this function. The following Part illustrates how this challenge comes
into play in the context of three major international regulatory regimes:
health, environment, and human rights.
II. COMPLIANCE MONITORING IN ACTION:
HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
International regulatory regimes, and the lOs that represent them, vary
widely. Their compliance monitoring functions differ accordingly. As it is
hardly possible to depict a fully representative picture of compliance moni-
49. See, e.g., discussion infra Part lI.B. Third-party states can also serve as monitors,
although this monitoring method is not common. One example is international trade regula-
tion. World Trade Organization rules are only enforced as a result of formal complaints from
member states. See DAI, supra note 30, at 54-56.
50. E.g., DAI, supra note 30, at 61-65.
51. Philip Alston, Beyond 'Them'and 'Us': Putting Treaty Body Reform into Perspec-
tive, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 501, 509 (Philip Alston &
James Crawford eds., 2000).
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toring across 1Os, this Article focuses on three major fields of international
regulation: health, environment, and human rights. Several reasons underlie
this choice.
First, these international regulatory regimes comprise an almost univer-
sal membership: the central body responsible for international health
regulation, the WHO, has 193 members;5 2 the primary environmental trea-
ties are signed by a large majority of states;5 3 and the international human
rights regime applies to a large number of the 192 member states of the
United Nations.54
Second, these regimes reflect a diversity of compliance monitoring ar-
rangements. International health regulation is structured around the WHO-
a single institution that lacks a formally binding legal authority, but in some
cases, exercises a defacto authority. International regimes of environmental
regulation lack a centralized enforcement body, but draw on increasingly
stringent treaty provisions that attempt to ensure state compliance (or at
least transparency about noncompliance). The U.N. human rights treaty
committees, in contrast, are an example of toothless bodies that lack the
capacity to enforce member states' reporting obligations.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, these three regimes were chosen
because of their inherent weaknesses in effectively monitoring and collect-
ing information on state compliance.55 While other international regimes
(including finance, trade, and nuclear nonproliferation) possess, by and
large, sufficient tools to assess (and, at times, enforce) state compliance, 6
the 1Os that are discussed below lack these capacities. Hence, the use of
information technologies for compliance monitoring purposes can be partic-
ularly attractive to these international bodies.
A. Health
The past decade has been marked by several severe and acute outbreaks
of infectious diseases that captured a great deal of attention and caused
heavy losses to the global economy. Such diseases spread quickly, frequent-
ly defy efforts to develop effective and timely medical responses, and
require coordinative, institutional solutions to contain their damage.
52. Countries, WHO, http://www.who.int/countries/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2011).
53. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 314
tbl.25 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR20072008-EN-Complete.pdf.
54. Human Rights, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 4.2, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ (last updated Aug. 24, 2010).
55. See DAI, supra note 30, for a discussion of the weaknesses of environmental and
human rights lOs. The WHO has, at least partially, overcome this challenge. This account
mostly refers to its past practices. See discussion infra Part li1.B. 1.
56. For a discussion of lOs' monitoring capacities in these regimes, see Xinyuan Dai,
Information Systems of Treaty Regimes, 54 WORLD POL. 405,406 (2002).
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The burden to provide such solutions generally lies on the WHO-an
international organization established by the United Nations to fulfill the
mandate of protecting global health. The membership of the WHO currently
consists of 193 countries, all of whom are also members of the United Na-
tions.57 The WHO is governed by a constitution that grants the organization
authority to promulgate regulations and make nonbinding recommendations
regarding the preservation of global health and safety.58 Pursuant to these
powers, the WHO adopted in 1951 the "International Sanitary Regulations,"
which were later renamed as the "International Health Regulations" (IHR).59
The IHR regime was based on two principles: states' duty to share with the
WHO information related to several specified infectious diseases on their
soil, and the WHO's obligation to minimize the interference of its recom-
mendations with international trade and travel in response to disease
outbreaks.
60
The IHR provided a poor solution to severe outbreaks of infectious dis-
eases. Fierce criticism regarding the overly limited scope of the WHO's
authority led to a decision to revise and expand the regulations. 61 Following
a decade of negotiations, the new IHR entered into force in June 2007. They
required each WHO member state to "develop, strengthen and maintain...
57. Countries, supra note 52.
58. Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 2(k), July 22, 1946, 62 Stat.
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185; e.g., WHO, Revision of the International Health Regulations arts. 21,
23, WHA58.3 (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-files/WHA58/
WHA58_3-en.pdf [hereinafter Revised IHR].
59. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011, at 382
(2011); see also David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health
Security: The New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 325, 337-33
(2005).
60. Fidler, supra note 59, at 328. The IHR initially applied to six diseases-cholera,
plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus, and yellow fever. It was slightly modified in 1973
(particularly for cholera) and again in 1981 (to exclude smallpox, in view of its global eradica-
tion).
61. See DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 221-78
(1999); Lauren Z. Asher, Confronting Disease in a Global Arena, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 135, 149 (2001); John D. Blum, Law as Development: Reshaping the Global Legal
Structures of Public Health, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 207, 228 (2004); Michelle Forrest, Us-
ing the Power of the World Health Organization: The International Health Regulations and
the Future of International Health Law, 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 153, 154-55 (2000);
Allyn L. Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of Infectious Diseases: Toward a Reinforced
Role for the International Health Regulations, 33 Hous. L. REV. 1327, 1328-29 (1997); Bar-
bara von Tigerstrom, The Revised International Health Regulations and Restraint of National
Health Measures, 13 HEALTH L.J. 35, 35 (2005).
The resolution to revise the IHR was adopted in 1995 pursuant to the outbreaks of chol-
era in Peru, plague in India, and Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Zaire. WHO Secretariat, Revision
and Updating of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report, 5, A52/9 (April 1,
1999); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, World Health Law: Toward a New Conception of Global




the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events" that may constitute a
public health emergency of international concern. 62 As part of this obliga-
tion, member states were required to establish "focal points"63 that must
notify the WHO of such events and any health measures taken in response to
them. 6 Upon notification, the WHO Director-General "shall determine, on
the basis of the information received, . . . whether an event constitutes a
public health emergency of international concern in accordance with the
criteria and the procedure set out in these Regulations. '65 If the Director-
General finds that international concerns do arise, the WHO issues recom-
mendations in response to the emergency. 66
Although the WHO is formally obligated to limit the interference of its
recommendations with international trade and travel, the primary weakness
of the IHR is that they do not provide states with incentives to cooperate and
share information about detected trends of emerging diseases. A notification
about a rapidly spreading disease practically isolates the affected state from
the rest of the world: it limits or even eliminates movement of people and
goods to and from the country, deters foreign investments, requires costly
response and precautionary measures, and often generates public hysteria.
For example, in the case of Swine Flu, some foreign states issued travel no-
tices warning against travel to Mexico-the declared epicenter of the
disease-and quarantined passengers arriving from the country with fever.67
Other states banned pork imports from Mexico, 68 although the WHO insist-
ed that consumption of pork could not transmit the disease. As a result, the
Mexican gross national product was expected to significantly decrease with-
in weeks after the outbreak of the disease. 69
Given these heavy costs, it is natural that states comply with their noti-
fication obligations to the WHO only as a matter of last resort. The IHR
allow them this option. The regulations grant states wide discretion in de-
termining whether "a public health emergency of international concern" has
62. Revised IHR, supra note 58, arts. 5(1), 13(1).
63. Id. art. 4(l).
64. Id. art. 6(1). An "event" is defined as a "manifestation of disease or an occurrence
that creates a potential for disease." Id. art. 1(1). "Public health emergency" is defined as "an
extraordinary event which is determined ... (i) to constitute a public health risk to other
[member states] through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a
coordinated international response." Id.
65. Id. art. 12(1).
66. Id. arts. 15(1), 16.
67. Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong, Minding SARS, Announces Tough Measures in Re-
sponse to Swine Flu, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/
asia/27kong.html.
68. E.g., Aleksandras Budrys, Russia to Retain Swine Flu Pork Bans to June 1, REU-
TERS, Apr. 29, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLT884121.
69. The Butcher's Bill: Flu and the Global Economy, ECONOMIST, May 2, 2009, at 71,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/13576491; David Luhnow & Anthony Harrup,
Mexico's Economy Slumps, Dragged Down by U.S., WALL ST. J., May 29, 2009, at A14.
Fall 2011I]
Michigan Journal of International Law
occurred in their territory and requires notification.70 This discretion can
allow affected states to avoid notification by arguing that a disease does not
meet the criteria for a public health emergency. 71 Further, the revised IHR
(similar to other guidelines and recommendations issued by the WHO) are
essentially nonbinding and not accompanied by a formal regime of legal
sanctions.72 Unsurprisingly, this void, coupled with the economic costs of
notifying the WHO, often leads to noncompliance.
73
Moreover, while the disincentives to provide information regarding in-
fectious diseases seem considerable, the IHR do not provide potentially
affected states with incentives to comply and share information. In fact, the
IHR contain only one clause that is related to this issue: measures taken by
unaffected states "shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and
not more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alterna-
tives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection.
74
However, this vague requirement is not likely to suffice to save the economy
of an affected state. 75 Historical accounts of the development of the IHR
indeed demonstrate that the WHO has not managed to establish a reliable
notification and monitoring system. 76 Notwithstanding the potential reputa-
tion costs, states have been willing to take the risk, hiding traces and
delaying the notification of suspicious disease outbreaks. 77
70. Revised IHR, supra note 58, art. 6(1).
71. David Fidler, Emerging Trends in International Law Concerning Global Infectious
Disease Control, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 285, 287 (2003).
72. Although formally a dispute resolution procedure is in place, it is not mandatory.
See Revised IHR, supra note 58, art. 56; Kumanan Wilson, John S. Brownstein & David P.
Fidler, Strengthening the International Health Regulations: Lessons from the HINI Pandemic,
25 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 505, 507 (2010).
73. Indeed, analyses of WHO recommendations throughout the years demonstrate that
states often tend to disregard them. For example, only forty-one of 212 countries and territo-
ries adopted the WHO's policy recommending that schools educate children about HIV/AIDS,
and only 102 of 212 adopted the WHO's policy for treatment of tuberculosis. See, e.g., WHO,
REPORT ON INFECTIOUs DISEASES: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT 30-31
(1999), available at http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/pages/graph23.html.
74. Revised IHR, supra note 58, art. 43(I). States that do implement health measures
"which significantly interfere with international traffic shall provide to WHO the public health
rationale and relevant scientific information for it." Id. art. 43(3).
75. See David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases
and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 815-18 (1997).
76. Wilson, Brownstein & Fidler, supra note 72, at 506-07; see also International Con-
sultation on Strengthening National Capacities for Epidemic Preparedness and Response in
Support to the National Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005), Lyon,
France, May 2-5, 2006, Strengthening National Capacities for Epidemic Preparedness and
Response in Support to National Implementation of IHR(2005): Report of a WHO Meeting,
§§ 2.2.2, 5.2.2, WHO/CDS/EPR/LYO/2006.4 (2006), available at http://whqlibdoc
.who.int/hq/2006/WHOCDSEPRLYO_2006.4_eng.pdf (focusing on how member states
should develop their own systems).
77. As discussed below, these considerations played a major role in the Chinese gov-
emnment's attempts to hide cases of SARS from the WHO. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
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Hence, despite the fact that the WHO is a centralized, consensual, and
influential organization, its reporting system is deeply flawed and unrelia-
ble. Given the costs of complying with the notification obligations imposed
on states, the IHR lack sufficient sticks and carrots that would impel states
to share unfavorable information. However, in contrast to other international
regulatory regimes, the WHO has managed to overcome this hurdle and cir-
cumvent state authority in the pursuit of information on public health
emergencies. As Part III demonstrates, this has been made possible, to a
large extent, because of creative uses of information technologies.
B. Environment
International environmental regulation is a realm of concentrated costs
and diffuse benefits. Similar to international health catastrophes, environ-
mental problems rarely stay within the borders of a single state. Moreover,
the interdependency among states and the cooperation required to confront
these problems is even deeper in environmental issues compared to health
regulation. Bitterly contested issues such as climate change, hazardous
waste disposal, desertification, or marine pollution affect the environmental
conditions of all nations, even if only a handful of states are directly respon-
sible for them.
However, despite this deep interdependency, international environmen-
tal law lacks the same centralized organization of international health
regulation that could develop policies, issue recommendations or guidelines,
and facilitate enforcement. Rather, this branch of international regulation
relies on diffuse mechanisms of compliance monitoring. While the precise
nature of these mechanisms varies from one environmental treaty to another,
self-reporting is the primary source for compliance-related information.
7 8
Reporting obligations may require states to disclose data on their emissions
or discharges, provide inventories of their natural resources, share infor-
mation on private violations, or specify measures that have been taken to
comply with the international environmental regime. 79 As with other interna-
tional regimes that employ this measure, environmental self-reporting is
78. See, for example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 4, opened for signature June 4, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
[hereinafter UNFCCC], requiring information on greenhouse gas emissions and implementa-
tion measures taken by states; the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal art. 4, adopted Mar. 22, 1989, 1673
U.N.T.S. 125 [hereinafter Basel Convention], requiring reports on international movements of
hazardous wastes and information on implementation measures; and the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 7, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREA-
TY Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol], requiring data on
production, imports, and exports of ozone-depleting substances.
79. ELUI LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS, EFFECTIVENESS,
AND WORLD ORDER 125 (2006).
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similarly supposed to facilitate the evaluation of a state's performance.8" In
some cases, it may also contribute to the scientific and factual understanding
of environmental problems, allow comparisons among states, and help as-
sess the overall progress of member states in the implementation of their
environmental obligations. 8'
Naturally, and similarly to the international regulation of health, it is
difficult to expect fully accurate and reliable accounts of a state's environ-
mental situation. A survey issued in 1992 by the U.S. General Accounting
Office established that many of the parties to major environmental agree-
ments either never issued a report or often submitted incomplete reports.
82
Even states that have provided reports may be providing inaccurate infor-
mation. 83 While deliberate omissions might be uncommon in countries with
relatively transparent political processes and an insulated professional bu-
reaucracy, accurate reporting can hardly be expected from all members of an
international regime. 84 Moreover, even democratically mature states are not
exemplary reporters in this respect. 85
As self-reporting can hardly be considered sufficient or satisfactory to
monitor state compliance, environmental 1Os also rely on NGOs.86 At times,
these NGOs evaluate the credibility of state reports and assess existing na-
tional practices. 87 In other instances, they independently collect and analyze
compliance data and share their reports with environmental 10s.88 Although
80. Daniel Bodansky, The Role of Reporting in International Environmental Treaties:
Lessons for Human Rights Supervision, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING, supra note 51, at 361, 365-66.
81. Id. at 366-67. For instance, self-reporting by states under the Montreal Protocol
aided an understanding of whether additional regulation of ozone-depleting substances is
required. Id.
82. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-43, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENT: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ARE NOT WELL MONITORED 3-4 (1992).
83. Bodansky, supra note 80, at 361-62.
84. Two cases that are discussed in the literature in this context refer to the Soviet Un-
ion's inaccurate reporting with regard to whale hunting and dumping of radioactive waste at
sea. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 42, at 155-56; Bodansky, supra note 80, at 362.
85. For instance, democratic and transparent states may provide reports on general
measures they have undertaken to address an environmental obligation, "but rarely do they
provide information to enable a third party to determine whether these measures have been
sufficient." See LOUKA, supra note 79, at 125. While this difficulty could have been dealt with
by conducting a formal review of state reports, environmental regimes rarely allow independ-
ent experts to evaluate reports. See Jesse H. Ausubel & David G. Victor, Verification of
International Environmental Agreements, 17 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 1, 20-22 (1992)
(noting that formally, international regimes do not usually verify national reports, though
informal verification does take place); Dai, supra note 56, at 431 (stating that treaty organiza-
tions almost never review national reports, though NGOs do).
86. See BODANSKY, supra note 45, at 234-35; CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 42, at
164-65; DAI, supra note 30, at 63--64.
87. DAI, supra note 30, at 63-64.
88. For instance, the Climate Action Network examines national plans to mitigate cli-
mate change; Greenpeace monitors hazardous waste trade and whaling activities; TRAFFIC
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such reports usually lack an official status, they may offer 1Os some timely
and valuable guidance. Despite these benefits, NGOs cannot guarantee a
comprehensive and systematic monitoring of a complex regulatory regime.8 9
The lack of effective compliance monitoring mechanisms is particularly
detrimental in the context of environmental regulation because exposing
noncompliance (also known as the "naming and shaming" of violators) is
the main stick available to 1Os.9° In some cases fear of exposure is indeed a
sufficient measure to prompt compliance.9 However, the effectiveness of
this measure depends on the ability to obtain accurate and timely incriminat-
ing information. Under the current regime, 1Os' access to such information
is limited.
C. Human Rights
International human rights present an even bigger challenge for compli-
ance monitoring endeavors. State compliance with human rights treaties is
one of the most difficult aspects of international law. At times, it puts the
whole human rights project in question.92 As human rights violations usually
concern the citizens of one state and do not spill over, they do not result in
the interdependency that is typical of international health or environmental
regimes. Lacking direct self-interest in global compliance, foreign govern-
ments are reluctant to intervene in human rights violations in other countries
and are wary of intrusive international regimes. In such circumstances, a
"naming and shaming" strategy cannot guarantee success, as states do not
necessarily incur its negative consequences. "[I]nformation is largely inter-
nal" and "even reputational punishment is fraught with collective action
provides information about trade in endangered species under the CITES agreement; the In-
ternational Council for the Exploration of the Seas conducts independent scientific studies on
fisheries; the International Union for Conservation of Nature (formerly known as the World
Conservation Union) has been the primary authority on the status of threatened and endan-
gered species. See, e.g., BODANSKY, supra note 45, at 234-35; CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note
42, at 164-65; DA, supra note 30, at 64.
89. DAI, supra note 30, at 65.
90. BODANSKY, supra note 45, at 227; Jutta Brunnde, Enforcement Mechanisms in
International Law and International Environmental Law, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 1, 18-19 (Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-Tobias Stoll
& RUdiger Wolfrum eds., 2006) (explaining that many agreements allow for publication of
noncompliance records, but noting that some regimes may suspend privileges for noncompli-
ant states).
91. See Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and
Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS 160, 176-77 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
92. See SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 122 (mentioning that "[g]ovemments are quite
unlikely to comply with their international treaty obligations with respect to human rights if it
is not in their interest to do so").
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problems." 93 International human rights regimes may therefore "fall flat be-
cause [they] do not involve either joint gains or reciprocity."9 4
The understanding of these realities has led some scholars to reevaluate
the role of international human rights regimes. Instead of examining their
influence on international relations and politics, scholars' focus has shifted
to the regimes' effects on domestic actors. According to Beth Simmons, a
champion of this position, international human rights regimes influence do-
mestic politics in several ways. 95 First, they affect national agendas by
putting "new issues on the legislative table.'9 6 While these issues are not
necessarily controversial or politically challenging, they may nonetheless
lead to positive developments in a state's human rights practices. 97 Second,
human rights treaties may serve as a helpful tool for domestic courts that
aim to challenge existing state practices. 98 Lastly, Simmons posits that hu-
man rights treaties "can encourage local groups to mobilize to demand
attention to rights compliance."99 As part of this vision, treaties serve as
"identity" mechanisms that "encourage domestic stakeholders to begin to
see themselves as such."' 1
However, the mere existence of human rights treaties is not sufficient
for the realization of this scenario. Accurate and timely information on state
compliance is a necessary component without which domestic mechanisms
cannot be set in motion. While information from human rights 1Os can
clearly play a major role in this context, these 1Os' monitoring and collec-
tion capabilities are weak.
In the context of international human rights, monitoring requirements
were first adopted in 1966, with the signing of the two International Cove-
93. Id. at 125.
94. Id.; see also Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL.
Sci. 273, 288 (2010); Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59
INT'L ORG. 363, 374 (2005).
95. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 125-39.
96. Simmons, supra note 94, at 291.
97. See id. ("Dealing with what comes from the international community can alter
practices-as long as the changes are not too controversial."). For instance, a state with devel-
oped and progressive employment laws may undertake some further antidiscrimination
obligations without substantial political constraints.
98. Domestic human rights litigation was particularly helpful in the cases under the
Convention Against Torture in Chile and Israel, and under the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in Japan and Colombia. SIMMONS, supra note
18, at 362.
99. Simmons, supra note 94, at 291.
100. Id. This approach implies that compliance with human rights treaties is strongest
"in polities in which domestic stakeholders have both the motive and the means to organize to
demand compliance." Id. Simmons states that these conditions are absent both in stable autoc-
racies (where citizens have no means to mobilize) and in stable democracies (where rights are
already protected and citizens lack strong motives to mobilize). Hence, human rights treaties
are likely to strengthen states' human rights records in partial and transitioning democracies,
where citizens have both motives and means to mobilize. Id.
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nants' 0 and other human rights treaties. 10 2 As part of these requirements,
member states were subjected to regular reporting obligations "on the as-
sumption that the examination of reports would lead to a dialogue between
each state and the relevant treaty body, and to progressive improvements in
compliance."''0 3 States are required to assess their human rights practices and
report about their progress and the difficulties associated with the domestic
implementation of treaty obligations. 10 4 Reports are submitted to independ-
ent treaty committees that are responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the core U.N. human rights treaties. 105 These committees
evaluate states' submissions and publish concluding observations about the
reported implementation measures. 06 If necessary, they may also issue non-
binding recommendations on further implementation steps. 07
Not surprisingly, self-reporting is considered to be the weakest monitor-
ing mechanism available to human rights treaty committees. 0 8 While it may,
occasionally, raise awareness of a state's treaty obligations, there are no ef-
fective measures to oblige a noncooperative state to file reports on a timely
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
102. The International Labour Organization (ILO) was the first human rights body that
obliged member states to periodically submit compliance reports. See Lee Swepston, The
International Labour Organization and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 323, 329-31 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).
103. See James Crawford, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?, in
THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING, supra note 51, at 1, 1.
104. WALTER KALIN & JORG KUNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION 210-11 (2009); see also AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The
Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 253, 289-91 (2009)
(discussing how state reports are used by treaty bodies in monitoring treaty implementation).
105. The committees are the following: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); Human Rights Committee (ICCPR); Committee against Torture (CAT);
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW); Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families (ICRMW); Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CPAPED); Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
106. Human rights committees increasingly rely on quantitative indicators and bench-
marks to measure state compliance with human rights treaties. For an overview of this
practice, see generally Maria Green, What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators:
Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062, 1076-84 (2001);
Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 104, at 288-89. For a general analysis of the use of indica-
tors by a variety of international institutions, see Kevin E. Davis et al., Indicators as a
Technology of Global Governance 28-48 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-26, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 583431.
107. KALIN & KONZLI, supra note 104, at 211.
108. Id.
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basis or, in fact, file them at all. °9 Aside from the low response rate, the reli-
ability of the reports is also questionable. Naturally, states do not have
incentives to reveal their human rights malpractices; an expectation of a full
and authentic disclosure is therefore ungrounded. As a variety of financial
and technical constraints prevent treaty committees from thoroughly
analyzing even the reports that were duly submitted, their chances to
independently expose noncompliance are slim."0
In light of the deficiencies of the self-reporting mechanism, major
human rights treaties have allowed a limited system of interstate and
individual complaints. Some of the treaties enable states to file complaints
against other states, even if their own interests are not concerned."'
However, this procedure is hardly used." 2 States do not have incentives to
expend their political resources to enforce human rights treaties in other
nations, which could have the side-effect of impairing their relations with
these nations or triggering countercomplaints."13 Furthermore, mechanisms
that are set to handle individual complaints are far from being efficacious.'4
The weaknesses of all the above methods substantially strengthen the
role of NGOs as the major source of compliance data for human rights 1Os.
It has been noted that "the United Nations is virtually completely dependent
on human rights data collected and presented by NGOs for their own activi-
ties in the area of supervision and monitoring, since generally these are the
109. Reportedly, as of February 2006, only eight of 194 states that are party to one or
more of the major U.N. treaties were up to date with their reports. The remaining 186 states
owed 1442 reports to the human rights treaty bodies. U.N. Secretariat, Concept Paper on the
High Commissioner's Proposalfor a Unified Standing Treaty Body: Report by the Secretariat,
16, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2 (Mar. 26, 2006). A survey conducted by the U.N. Secretary-
General in 1992 reached largely similar conclusions: of the 164 member states to one or more
of the major human rights treaties, substantially all were behind on at least one report, and
twenty-seven were missing ten reports or more. See U.N. Secretary-General, Status of Interna-
tional Human Rights Instruments and the General Situation of Overdue Reports, U.N. Doc.
HRI/MC/1992/3 (Sept. 25, 1992).
110. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 42, at 161; Crawford, supra note 103, at 5-7.
Ill. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 21, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-201, 465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 11, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 33, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
112. KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 104, at 234.
113. Id. at 235; see also SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 122.
114. See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations:
What Role for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREA-
TY MONITORING, supra note 51, at 15, 53.
Human rights treaties also allow treaty committees a limited authority for independent
investigations "if reliable and well-founded information indicates that serious and systematic
violations of the rights concerned are being perpetrated." KALIN & KONZLI, supra note 104, at
237. The effectiveness of these procedures is, however, limited. See id.
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only readily accessible data available."'"I5 Indeed, NGOs strategically sched-
ule the publication of their country reports in proximity to the review
meetings held periodically by human rights committees.
16
While NGOs' reports serve as the de facto primary sources of infor-
mation for 1Os, this situation is not ideal. As NGOs operate according to their
own agendas, priorities, and internal constraints, they should not substitute for
the monitoring functions of official human rights 1Os that comprise universal
state membership, but rather complement them. As the agendas and priorities
of official 1Os may be no less disputed than those of human rights NGOs, the
best case scenario would be to integrate the two methods of compliance
monitoring. Both 1Os and NGOs should be able to inspect state behavior,
draw independent conclusions, supplement each other's work, and, if neces-
sary, expose biases and distorted priorities. While the deficiencies of 1Os'
monitoring endeavors currently prevent such a scenario, the discussion be-
low demonstrates how information technologies can help realize it.
To sum up, the institutional designers of international regulatory regimes
assign 1Os a substantial role in monitoring and collecting information on state
compliance with international obligations. Since these bodies are not endowed
with rigorous enforcement mechanisms, they are supposed to perform the
role of data clearinghouses--collecting compliance-related information
from various sources and disseminating it to actors that can make use of it,
either domestically or internationally. Incriminating information on viola-
tions of public health obligations, for instance, can be used by domestic
advocacy groups that will attempt to put the information on the national
agenda, bring the responsible officials to courts, or use it for internal mobili-
zation purposes. Data on environmental violations can be used by foreign
states via formal or informal channels to compel or convince the violating
state to comply. As occurred during the unrest in Egypt in 2011, information
on human rights violations can strengthen local political groups and bolster
their activities.' 17
However, as discussed above, 1Os systematically underperform and fail
to rise up to these expectations. As a result, 1Os' inability to effectively col-
lect and disseminate information on state compliance breaks the
clearinghouse cycle. Without reliable compliance information, it is harder to
115. Pieter H. Kooijmans, The Non-Governmental Organizations and the Monitoring
Activities of the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
15, 16-17 (Alex Geert Castermans et al. eds., 1990); accord CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note
42, at 164; see also Alston, supra note 51, at 509.
116. DAI, supra note 30, at 59.
117. John D. Sutter, The Faces of Egypt's 'Revolution 2.0,' CNN (Feb. 21, 2011, 12:25
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/02/21/egypt.intemet.revolution/index.html.
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set in motion the wheels of either domestic or international enforcement." 8
This situation clearly undermines the effectiveness of international regulato-
ry regimes in fields as important as health, environment, and human rights.
Assuming that these regimes embody a desirable regulatory framework that
we wish to sustain and keep viable, the monitoring deficiency is worrisome.
There may be a variety of responses to handle this challenge. This Arti-
cle illuminates one particular solution that is promising in terms of both
effectiveness and ease of implementation-the use of information technolo-
gies.
III. THE PROMISE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
Information technologies can support the monitoring efforts of lOs both
indirectly and directly. The indirect approach is relatively modest and large-
ly consists of enhanced transparency. However flawed the existing
mechanisms of self-reporting and the compliance data provided to lOs by
NGOs are, they constitute large databases that have been exclusively held
and managed by lOs. Before the internet era, access to these databases was
naturally limited to a handful of professionals and public officials. This state
of affairs has now changed, as all compliance-related data can potentially be
made available on lOs' websites. Given that the goal of monitoring and col-
lection of compliance information by lOs is to further disseminate it to
international and domestic actors, improved access to information surely
contributes to the task.
The direct approach is more ambitious. The internet can also be used by
lOs to independently search for compliance-related information that has not
reached them via the traditional channels of states and NGOs. While this
method is still uncommon, it has already been employed in the context of
international health regulation where it generated promising and reliable
results." 9 Three major mechanisms have been used in this respect: (a) web
crawlers (i.e., automated search engines) that are programmed to browse a
wide variety of online news sources looking for specific keywords;
(b) online networks of experts who instantly share compliance-related
information and transmit notices to the relevant lOs; and (c) online plat-
forms that allow lay persons to report and share compliance-related
information they happen to possess.
The next two Sections discuss the indirect (access to compliance infor-
mation) and direct (distributed collection of compliance information)
versions of compliance monitoring in the context of international health,
environment, and human rights regulation.
118. Data that is generated by NGOs can offer some redress in this respect. However,
their resources are limited, they are often perceived as biased, and they lack the credibility of
lOs with universal membership.
119. See discussion infra Part IlII.B'L
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A. Access to Information
Information technologies can open up the data that 1Os already possess
to wider audiences. The advantages of placing datasets online are straight-
forward. Primarily, by lowering the threshold of access to compliance
information, the 10 better fulfills its role as an information clearinghouse.
While most states may have had access to some parts of this information
even without the internet, a large database that contains full compliance data
on all members of an international regulatory regime had certainly been
unattainable before the internet age. Governments may now rely on this in-
formation in order to put pressure on violating states, negotiate international
agreements, better assess their own performance vis-a-vis the practices of
other states, or frame their foreign policies.
Furthermore, easily accessible compliance information is particularly
important for domestic NGOs, local advocacy groups, and private individu-
als who are interested in the subject matter. Official data on state compliance
had been practically unavailable to many of these actors. Costless access to
this information empowers them in all civil and political actions they might
be engaging in-mobilization of activists, lobbying for legislative reforms,
or judicial proceedings in national courts. Access to compliance information
on all member states is particularly important in this respect, as comparative
data may serve as a powerful tool for persuasion and political pressure. For
instance, clear evidence that a state lags behind all other countries in its
greenhouse gas emissions reduction may help local environmental groups to
convince courts, legislators, or other public officials that certain implemen-
tation steps should be taken. While before the internet resources had to be
invested in order to obtain such evidence, publicly available databases now
obviate these costs. 20
Costless access is not the only advantage of information technologies.
The internet also redefines what types of compliance data are regarded as
official and reliable. As the lOs in question are intergovernmental bodies
with universal membership, they do not merely serve as clearinghouses of
information, but rather as the official clearinghouses. Hence, if a human
rights 10 places on its website compliance reports that were produced by
local or international NGOs, this may be sufficient to elevate the status of
these NGOs and acknowledge the reliability and accuracy of their data. Alt-
hough these reports might have been accessible without the internet, their
publication on 1Os' official websites signals their credibility and boosts the
influence, publicity, and legitimacy of the reporting NGOs.
Despite the benefits of reliable online access to information, 1Os in the
fields of health, environment, and human rights lack explicit policies in this
context. The following pages survey the information that can be found on
120. Naturally, the establishment and maintenance of online datasets impose costs on the
responsible lOs. These costs, however, should not be high, as 1Os already possess this infor-
mation-all that is required is to make it public.
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1Os' official websites. The last Subsection suggests what the cornerstones of
an online access policy should be.
1. Health
The WHO website provides a profile for each member state, consisting
of extensive health statistics and information on particular health issues that
affect the state.' 2 ' The statistics include basic health facts about a country,
such as life expectancy under various specifications, national expenditure on
health, immunizations, prevalence of diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV,
and the distribution of causes of deaths. 22 For each country, the website also
displays information such as its national health system, collaborating health
centers, data on nutrition, risk factors, health service coverage, mortality and
burden of disease (e.g., chronic diseases), and more.2 3 Some of the state
profiles also feature documents describing the WHO's "cooperation strate-
gy" with the state-health aid programs, partnerships with local health
institutions, and a strategic agenda for the collaboration between the WHO
and the surveyed state. 24 The website contains ample amounts of interactive
and easily graspable health information. However, it does not provide data
on state compliance with the IHR. Although some state profiles contain data
on "disease outbreaks," this information is only partial, 25 and it is not pos-
sible to discern from it whether the state complies with its obligations to the
WHO.
2. Environment
One of the most comprehensive environmental websites is operated by
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Secretariat. 2 6 The website offers vast background information on climate
change and on the operation of the UNFCCC regime. 27 More importantly, it
121. Countries, supra note 52.
122. See, e.g., United States of America: Health Profile, WHO, http://www.who.int/gho/
countries/usa.pdf (last updated Apr. 4, 2011 ).
123. See, e.g., Countries: United States of America, WHO, http://www.who.int/
countries/usa/en/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). For data on different countries, see Countries,
supra note 52.
124. See, e.g., WHO, Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Egypt 2010-2014,
EM/ARD/037/E/R/l2.10 (2010), available at http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation-
strategy/ccs-egy-en.pdf; WHO, WHO-China Country Cooperation Strategy 2008-2013
(2008), available at http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation-strategy/ccs-chn-en.pdf.
125. For instance, there is no information on Swine Flu on the Mexican page. Global
Alert and Response (GAR): Mexico, WHO, http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/countryl
mex/en/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
126. UNFCCC, http://www.unfccc.int (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). This site is related to
both the treaty, UNFCCC, supra note 78, and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, opened for
signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.
127. For instance, the "Documentation" page allows for searching a vast database of
official documents issued since 1991 as part of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol regimes
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operates as a large repository of information related to state compliance,
providing several search options. For instance, the tab "Kyoto Protocol" on
the homepage provides data on compliance under the Kyoto Protocol,1
28
featuring reports submitted by states and notes prepared by the Secretariat
with regard to the compliance of several states. Further, a category named
"Parties & Observers" enables users to view national communications, in-
depth reviews, demonstrable progress reports, and other implementation
documents available for each member state. 129
While the website of the UNFCCC is the most comprehensive to date,
the websites of other environmental lOs are similarly well developed. The
Convention on Biological Diversity website, for example, provides an anal-
ysis section on state compliance, 3 along with sophisticated search options
for state reports.' 3' The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) 32 website provides background information on the treaty
regime (for example, official documents, national reports, and publications),
but in contrast to websites that only provide a broad array of general infor-
mation on the relevant environmental regime, CITES specifically focuses on
instances of noncompliance. 3 3 For instance, under the category of "Trade
Suspensions," the website lists a chart of states that are currently subject to a
recommendation to suspend trade and the background for the recommenda-
tion. 13 4
However, despite the richness of compliance-related information on
these websites, they hardly represent the norm among environmental 1Os. In
(including state reports, in-depth reviews, and assessment reports of greenhouse gas invento-
ries). Documentation, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/documentation/items/2643.php (last visited
Oct. 15, 2011).
128. Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-
protocollcompliancelitems12875.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
129. Parties & Observers, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/partiesand-observers/items/
2704.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
130. National Reports Analyzer, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://www.cbd.int/reports/analyzer.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
131. National Reports and NBSAPs, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://www.cbd.int/reports/search/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). The website also offers back-
ground on the convention (history, parties, mechanisms), the Protocol, specific thematic
programs (e.g., forest biodiversity), cross-cutting issues (e.g., liability and redress), and mech-
anisms (links to national reports, financial information, and partner organizations). See
generally CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int (last visited Oct. 15,
2011). See Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, for the convention text itself.
The Basel Convention website similarly provides state reports, although its database is
less comprehensive than the other conventions. BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int (last
visited Oct. 15, 2011). For the full citation of the treaty, see Basel Convention, supra note 78.
132. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
[CITES] art. VIII, approved Mar. 3, 1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
133. CITES, http://www.cites.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
134. Countries Currently Subject to a Recommendation to Suspend Trade, CITES,
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/tradesuspension.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
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fact, a substantial number of major international environmental regimes do
not provide access to compliance-related information.
13 5
3. Human Rights
Compared to the websites of the WHO and some environmental 1Os,
the websites of the human rights treaty committees are the least developed.
The committees lack a common policy regarding online access to compli-
ance data and, as a result, the scope of materials on the committees'
websites and their accessibility to users varies. For instance, the website of
the Committee Against Torture 3 6 contains state reports since 1997, conclud-
ing observations of the committee, and supplementary materials submitted
by NGOs. Additionally, because the site is part of the website for the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the website pro-
vides a link to the comprehensive general search engine of the OHCHR.
Similar information is offered by the Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, which provides reports submitted by each state
since 1994, compliance-related questionnaires sent to states and their re-
sponses, summary observations for each reporting state, and more.' The
Human Rights Committee also publishes on its website state reports, but the
website is not easily accessible and reports are not easily findable. 3 8 Com-
parable information is provided by the other committee websites.'39
135. For instance, the website of the Montreal Protocol Unit states the goal of the unit
is assisting countries "in complying with the Montreal Protocol's control measures," but
does not provide any data on compliance. For the Montreal Protocol website, see Environ-
ment and Energy, UNDP, http://www.undp.org/environment/index.shtml (last visited Oct.
15, 2011). For comparable examples, see Air Pollution, U.N. EcON. COMM'N FOR EUR.,
http://live.unece.org/env/lrtap/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) for information
related to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signa-
ture Nov. 13, 1979, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217.
136. Committee Against Torture, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
[OHCHR], http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). This web-
site is related to the Convention Against Torture, supra note I11.
137. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N., http://
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/committee.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). This
website is related to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, opened for signature Mar. I, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
138. Human Rights Committee, OHCHR, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011). This website is related to the ICCPR, supra note 101.
139. For example, see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OHCHR,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) for the ICESCR,
supra note 101; Committee on Migrant Workers, OHCHR, http://www2.ohchr.orgl
english/bodies/cmw/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011), for the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, opened for
signature, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Committee on the Rights of the Child, OHCHR,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011), for the Convention on




Despite the benefits of online access to compliance information, the
practices of 1Os vary substantially in terms of what data is available on their
website, to what extent noncompliance information is present, and how the
information is displayed. Most of the organizations surveyed above provide
large amounts of unstructured information and leave it to the individual user
to find hints of state compliance or noncompliance. Sometimes, the websites
are sufficiently interactive and this task is intuitive. It is likely, however, that
users may often find it difficult to effectively navigate the website and reach
the information they are interested in. Since effective online access to com-
pliance information is important for strengthening the international
regulatory regime, this situation is lamentable.
Two policy proposals can be helpful in this respect. The first one is
straightforward: state compliance information should be systematically up-
loaded and maintained on the official websites of 1Os. 1Os should develop
coherent policies of data management and periodically review them as tech-
nology evolves. The costs associated with the maintenance of these websites
are trivial in comparison to the positive results they may yield.
The second policy proposal concerns how compliance information
should appear on 1Os' websites. The first option is "full transparency"-
placing information online "as is" and generating massive databases for
each member state. The advantage of this option is that all information is
publicly available and searchable online. Anyone who is interested can
freely access the website, search the database, and draw independent con-
clusions based on their own analysis of the available facts. However, the
number of individuals who can actually perform these actions is limited.
Placing massive datasets on a website is not a guarantee that this infor-
mation will be sensibly comprehended. 40 Rather, it may generate confusion,
distort conclusions, or simply go unnoticed. In this sense, more information
does not always produce better knowledge or understanding. Individuals
may ignore, misunderstand, or misuse certain aspects of the data, depend-
ing on their unique and complex "chains of comprehension, action, and
response."'14 1 Moreover, the overwhelming amounts of information availa-
ble online may create "attention spans,"'142 which prevent users from going
into the depth of all the data available to them and instead lead them to
140. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 53 (2007); Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 2009, at 37, 39-40, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-
arts/against-transparency.
141. FUNG, GRAHAM & WELL, supra note 140, at 53 (noting that comprehension of in-
formation is inseparable from the interests, resources, cognitive capacities, cultural
background, and social contexts of the individuals who consume it).
142. Lessig, supra note 140, at 40.
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focus on specific and often out-of-context details. The result, as Lawrence
Lessig posits, is a "systemic misunderstanding."''4 3
A possible solution to these pitfalls is to ensure that transparency is
"targeted"--conveying information in standardized and user-centric ways
that allow individuals to readily grasp, compare, and disaggregate it."44
While this task is not easy in practical terms, it is certainly doable for most
types of information.145 For instance, the website of the Convention on
Biological Diversity provides an overview of states' reports and highlights
the major implementation steps each state has taken. Although this infor-
mation relies on self-reports submitted by states and thus cannot be
considered fully reliable, it offers an example of how targeted transparen-
cy in the context of international environmental regulation could look.
These two approaches have different implications that should be taken
into account. Full transparency restricts the discretion of the 10 and requires
third parties to make the effort of delving into the reports and informing the
public. In the absence of such committed third parties, this policy can be
problematic. Targeted transparency grants discretion to the 10 to decide
what information should be placed on the radar and how to frame and struc-
ture it. A combination of these two approaches is perhaps the most
appealing option for providing effective online access to information. Two
types of information should therefore be available on 1Os' websites: targeted
and user-centric information on state compliance that would be accessible
and understandable for wide audiences; and full datasets of information that
could be used by sophisticated third parties and also serve as a potential
check on the 10's interpretation and presentation of targeted information.
While online access to information is far from being a settled issue for
1Os, it does not raise significant normative concerns. 1Os are likely to gradu-
ally adopt information technologies as part of their day-to-day operation.
The primary challenge in this respect is how to accurately frame and contex-
tualize compliance data.
The next Section and the rest of the Article are dedicated to a more am-
bitious and problematic use of information technologies for compliance
monitoring-a practice in which 1Os actively search for compliance data via
the internet.
B. Online Compliance Monitoring
Improved access to information is not the only possible effect of infor-
mation technologies on state compliance with international obligations.
143. Id.
144. FUNG, GRAHAM & WElL, supra note 140, at 37-38.
145. For policy suggestions, see id. at 170-82.
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More ambitious uses of the internet, which are already underway in some
international venues, may lead to deep and dramatic changes in the way
state compliance is observed and international regulation is made. As of
now, the WHO has been the pioneer in this new territory. However, other
international regulatory regimes possess the means to join in and begin their
own experiments with online compliance monitoring.
1. Health
The core obligations of the WHO member states are to collect and re-
port information about events that may constitute a public health
emergency. 46 Compliance with these obligations has proved to be problem-
atic though. Some states are reluctant to disclose potentially harmful
information even if they possess it. 147 Other states may lack the capacity to
fulfill their obligations and produce the necessary information. 4 ' Unlike
other international regulatory regimes, the WHO has been known for its
proactive collection of compliance information from the media and various
nongovernmental bodies. 49 Recently, the mandate of the organization to
rely on these sources was buttressed by the revised IHR, which authorized
the WHO to bypass member states in its compliance monitoring efforts. 
5 0
The internet has been playing a vital role in the monitoring activities of
the WHO, generating a situation in which "the majority of the world's in-
formation about infectious disease outbreaks no longer comes from
voluntary reporting by countries ... [but] from real-time electronic commu-
nications and the World Wide Web."'' The following pages survey the
mechanisms that are currently employed by the organization and discuss
their effects on the detection and analysis of global pandemics.
146. See discussion supra accompanying notes 58-66.
147. See discussion supra accompanying notes 70-77.
148. David P. Fidler & Lawrence 0. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations:
An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
85, 88 (2006).
149. Reportedly, out of 1315 unverified reports of an infectious disease outbreak that
were received by WHO between January 2001 and October 2004, only thirty-nine percent
were reported by governmental officials, while the rest came from unofficial sources (such as
electronic media and NGOs). See David L. Heymann, SARS and Emerging Infectious Diseas-
es: A Challenge to Place Global Solidarity Above National Sovereignty, 35 ANNALS ACAD.
MED. SING. 350, 350 (2006).
150. Revised IHR, supra note 58, art. 9. Specifically, the revised IHR allowed the organi-
zation to "collect information regarding events through its surveillance activities and assess
their potential to cause international disease spread and possible interference with internation-
al traffic." Id. art. 5(4).
151. Heymann, supra note 149, at 350.
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a. Technological Advances
i. Networks of Experts
The digital experiments of the WHO began in 1994 with the launch of
the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED)--a moderated
electronic mailing list through which subscribers could rapidly share infor-
mation on public health events.112 ProMED is currently a publicly available
reporting system, with more than 45,000 subscribers in 188 countries.'53 It
disseminates "information on outbreaks by e-mailing and posting case re-
ports, including many gleaned from readers, along with expert
commentary."'' 54 In 2006, the functions of the ProMED mailing list were
expanded by the development of EpiSPIDER-a visualization supplement
that displays the topic intensity of ProMED emails on a map and automati-
cally converts them into RSS feeds.
55
The most avid users of ProMED are professional health workers who
share their experiences with their peers via the mailing list. Ties among the-
se professionals are strengthened by the Global Outbreak Alert & Response
Network (GOARN), established by the WHO in 1998.156 Participation in
GOARN is open to "technical institutions, networks and organizations that
have the capacity to contribute to the international outbreak alert and
response."'' 57 It currently consists of over 400 health professionals, operating
in forty countries and over 120 public health institutions throughout the
world. 58 The declared goal of GOARN is to "improve the coordination of
international outbreak responses and to provide an operational framework to
focus the delivery of support to countries."' 59 It aims to assist affected coun-
tries with disease control efforts by ensuring appropriate technical support
152. Stephen S. Morse, Global Infectious Disease Surveillance and Health Intelligence,
26 HEALTH AFF. 1069, 1072 (2007). For an overview of the history of ProMED, see generally
Lawrence Madoff & John P. Woodall, The Internet and the Global Monitoring of Emerging
Diseases: Lessons from the First 10 Years of ProMED-mail, 36 ARCHIVES MED. RES. 724
(2005); see also ProMED-mail, INT'L SOC'Y FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, http://
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/fPp=2400: 1000 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
153. John S. Brownstein et al., Digital Disease Detection-Harnessing the Web for Pub-
lic Health Surveillance, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2153, 2153 (2009).
154. Id.
155. Mikaela Keller et al., Use of Unstructured Event-Based Reports for Global Infec-
tious Disease Surveillance, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 689, 691-93 (2009). An RSS
(Rich Site Summary) feed is a format for delivering regularly changing web content. See also
EpiSPIDER, http://www.epispider.info/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
156. DAvID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE 66
(2004).
157. Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network, WHO, http://www.who.int/csr/
outbreaknetwork/en/ (last visited Oct. 15, 201 I).
158. Global Outbreak and Response Network-GOARN: Partnership in Outbreak Re-
sponse, WHO, http://www.who.intlcsrloutbreaknetwork/goarnenglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2011) [hereinafter Partnership in Outbreak Response]; Heymann, supra note 149, at 350-51.
159. Partnership in Outbreak Response, supra note 158.
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to affected populations, validating disease-related information, investigating
events and assessing risks of disease threats, and supporting national out-
break preparedness. 160 As GOARN extensively uses mailing lists such as
ProMED for its emergency and nonemergency communications, it provides
an unprecedented degree of access and response to public health event in-
formation.
ii. Web Crawlers
As part of its compliance monitoring endeavors, the WHO also relies on
the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN)-a secure early
warning internet system that crawls the web, attempting to detect a wide
range of information about potential disease outbreaks.16" ' The system was
developed by the Canadian health authorities, responding to concern that
"the speed of health reporting in the news media was undermining the cred-
ibility and authority of public health [institutions] to manage [an]
outbreak."' 62 GPHIN uses extensive search queries to browse a large variety
of online news sources. Chiefly, it relies on global news aggregators such as
Factiva, which compiles over 9000 news sources in twenty-two lan-
guages. 63 Information gathered by the system is not public and subscription
is restricted to established public health organizations.6 In order to focus
its efforts on the central challenges of international health regulation,
GPHIN follows the scope of the revised IHR and concentrates its crawling
endeavors on six major areas: infectious diseases, biologics, chemical inci-
dents, environmental incidents, radioactive incidents, and natural
disasters. 165
The selection and management of reports that enter GPHIN are based
on both technology and human discretion. The automated scanning system
relies on a specific taxonomy of keywords and Boolean search syntaxes to
identify potentially relevant reports, filter duplicates, and arrange the reports
according to a scale of relevance. 66 Reports with a relevance score above a
certain threshold are automatically posted on GHPIN's website, while re-
ports with an even higher score are also sent to GOARN and the WHO as
160. Id.
161. Tenth Machine Translation Summit, Phuket, Thailand, Sept. 12-15, 2005, Abla
Mawudeku & Michael Blench, Invited Paper, Global Public Health Intelligence Network
(GPHIN), at i-7, http://www.mt-archive.info/MTS-2005-Mawudeku.pdf [hereinafter
Mawudeku & Blench]; see also The Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN),
PuB. HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/gphin/ (last updated Dec. 6,
2004).
162. Mykhalovskiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 43.
163. Id.; Mawudeku & Blench, supra note 161, at i-8.
164. Mykhalovskiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 43.
165. As of 2006, the estimate was that GPHIN processed between 2000 and 3000 reports
daily, one-fourth to one-third of which were discarded as irrelevant or duplicative. Mykhalov-
skiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 43.
166. Id.
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urgent email alerts. 6 7 The automated process is supplemented by profes-
sional analysts who decide the fate of reports "whose relevancy lies in the
zone between the automatic 'publish' and the automatic 'trash.' "68 The
analysts decide whether to publish such reports and also automatically re-
view the trashed ones to avoid false negatives. 69 As GPHIN lacks tools to
validate the information it retrieves, alerts are further analyzed by the WHO
and GOARN, tapping into a wide network of collaborators who are
equipped to detect early warning signs of diseases. As discussed in the con-
text of SARS and Swine Flu below,7 ° this network is vital for the early
detection and collaborative analysis of diseases.
GPHIN has been credited with detecting the first hints of forty percent
of the average of 200 to 250 disease outbreaks that the WHO further investi-
gated and verified as of 2004.'' Reportedly, GPHIN has undermined
governmental secrecy and control over public health information, providing
the WHO with "new forms of leverage in its efforts to encourage member
states to confirm and act on outbreaks occurring within their borders."'
7 2
Further, the fact that reports are received in real time allows the WHO to act
in a substantially faster manner. As technology improves, GPHIN is likely to
become all the more influential.
A different tool that operates outside of the formal WHO framework is
HealthMap--a university-based online knowledge management system that
has been active since 2006.173 HealthMap's goal is to "collect and visualize
outbreak data according to geography, time, and infectious disease agent."'' 74
The system aims "to bring structure to an information flow that would oth-
erwise be overwhelming to the user or obscure important and urgent
elements. 1 75 HealthMap is reportedly frequented by users from govern-
167. Mawudeku & Blench, supra note 161, at i-9. The GPHIN retrieves articles from
news aggregators every fifteen minutes.
168. Id. at i-9 to -10.
169. Reportedly, the analysts "rely on a knowledge of international infectious disease
trends as well as the broader political and economic context of the regions where potential
outbreaks have been reported." Mykhalovskiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 43.
170. See infra notes 187-212 and accompanying text.
171. Mykhalovskiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 44.
172. Id.
173. HealthMap is a private website that has been developed and operated by researchers
at Harvard University. See John S. Brownstein & Clark C. Freifeld, HealthMap: The Devel-
opment of Automated Real-Time Internet Surveillance for Epidemic Intelligence, 12 EURO
SURVEILLANCE 3322 (2007), available at http://eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?
Articleld=3322; see also HEALTHMAP, http://healthmap.org/en/ (last updated Oct. 15, 2011,
11:00 AM) (The HealthMap website is updated every hour).




ment-related bodies, such as the WHO, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control.'76
HealthMap automatically acquires new data in several languages from
nearly 20,000 websites every hour (including online news sources, RSS
feeds, ProMED email, and validated alerts by the WHO) by tracking key-
words related to seventy-five infectious diseases.'77 The "system filters
reports to determine relevance, disease, location and duplication clustering
by means of automated text processing algorithms."'178 Relevant reports are
then aggregated and displayed on a publicly available high-resolution map
where users can view the information according to date, disease, location,
and source. 79 While aggregation of external sources is an important feature
of the website, the site also emphasizes the value of individual participation.
Anyone who is willing to share any disease-related experience can post a
report on HealthMap. 8 ° The report is then tagged on the interactive map
alongside with notices from other sources. Individual reports are not verified
by the system, and hence their credibility may be questionable. However,
while one single report from a private individual can hardly be helpful to
detect trends of diseases, massive participation may serve as a more accurate
(even if problematic) indicator.
Public health institutions are not the only developers of web crawlers.
Google has also been part of the game. Recently, it developed a software
tool named Google Flu Trends that analyzes individual search queries
176. Id. (basing this on the system's usage tracking and subscriptions to electronic mail-
ing lists).
177. Duncan Jefferies, Information Outbreak, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 7, 2009, at 6,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/may/07/information-outbreak-swine-
flu.
178. David M. Hartley et al., The Landscape of International Event-Based Biosurveil-
lance, EMERGING HEALTH THREATS J., Feb. 19, 2010, at 4.
179. Id. Other systems that operate on a similar basis include BioCaster, the Division
of Integrated BioDefense, EpiSPIDER, Medical Information System (MedlSys), and
the Wildlife Disease Information Node. See id. at 2-5; see also BIOCASTER,
http://biocaster.nii.ac.jp/ (last updated Oct. 15, 2011, 11:45 AM) (linking to an interactive
map of "30 days of news," a page displaying health news by country and region, and an
"Ontology Browser"); Division of Integrated BioDefense, ISIS CTR., GEORGETOWN UNIV.
MED. CTR., http://biodefense.georgetown.edu/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (researching the
interaction of outbreaks and community responses); EpiSPIDER, supra note 155 (displaying
an interactive map and filtering information by news source, age of report, and type of disease
or natural disaster); Diseases, MEDISYs, http://medusa.jrc.it/medisys/categoryedition/
diseases/enldiseases.html (last updated Oct. 15, 2011, 11:30 AM) (sorting several news items
on diseases by type of disease and country); Wildlife Disease Information Node, NAT'L BIO-
LOGICAL INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, http://wildlifedisease.nbii.gov/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011)
(dividing information by type of disease, affected species, and hot topics).
180. HEALTHMAP, supra note 173 (allowing the viewer to add to the map by clicking on
a button on the map, which brings up a pop-up for submitting information via online form, e-
mail, phone call, text, or smartphone app, allowing the viewer to "[p]rovide an eyewitness
report" or "[s]hare a news report").
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related to influenza (e.g., "fever" or "sore throat")' 8' in order to detect early
signs of flu outbreaks. 82 While news reports are currently the major source
of information for internet surveillance systems, Google's logic has been
that concerns of the general public (as expressed in Google search queries)
can also serve as an important source of information. 83 For instance, esti-
mates indicate that thirty-seven to fifty-two percent of Americans seek
health related information online every year.'84 Hence, logs of keywords
chosen by users, coupled with location information that can be discerned
from IP addresses, can be mined and analyzed to reveal disease trends.
185
This approach proved fruitful when the Google Flu Trends software man-
aged to "generate an epidemic curve that closely matched" the results of the
"traditional surveillance" methods of flu outbreaks.
186
b. Information Technologies in Action
The following Subsections put the technological tools discussed above
into context and demonstrate their potential in instances where state compli-
ance is urgently required. Specifically, they explain the performance of these
tools in the context of two global pandemics: SARS and Swine Flu.
i. SARS
In November 2002, GPHIN detected local Chinese reports on an "unu-
sual respiratory illness" in the Guangdong Province. 87 This was the first
information about the disease that crossed the Chinese border, several
months before it was officially announced.'88 GPHIN sent an alert to the
181. Victor Galaz, Pandemic 2.0: Can Information Technology Help Save the Planet?,
ENVIRONMENT, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 20, 23.
182. See Google Flu Trends: Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE.ORG, http://
www.google.org/flutrends/aboutlfaq.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (basing its data on the
aggregate of millions of individual searches on Google over time and comparing them to a
baseline).
183. See Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influence Epidemics Using Search
Engine Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1012 (2009), available at http://
static.goog leusercontent.com/external-content/untrusted-dl cp/research.google.com/en/us/
archive/papers/detecting-influenza-epidemics.pdf (using "search queries to detect influenza
epidemics in areas with a large population of web search users").
184. Brownstein et al., supra note 153, at 2154.
185. Id.
186. Id. In retrospect, this method could have also been successful for an early detection
of HINI in Mexico. Arguably, an analysis of Google search queries in the period preceding
official reports about the disease demonstrated that early hints of an emerging flu outbreak had
already been on the surface. However, at that point, nobody looked for flu-related queries in
Veracruz, Mexico. See Alexis Madrigal, Google Could Have Caught Swine Flu Early, Blog
Entry in Wired Science, WIRED.COM (Apr. 29, 2009, 3:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/
wiredscience/2009/04/google-could-have-caught-swine-flu-early/.
187. Keller et al., supra note 155. at 691.
188. See id.; Mykhalovskiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 44.
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WHO but the organization at first disregarded it.' 89 In February 2003, an
additional alert from GPHIN about a "respiratory disease among health care
workers in Guangdong triggered an urgent alert to GOARN members" and
was also transmitted to the WHO. 190 At that time, the WHO issued an offi-
cial request for information from China and, when it refused to cooperate,
released a formal notification about a suspicious pneumonia outbreak in
China.'9 1 China was not willing to admit the existence of an epidemic, argu-
ing that the outbreak was under control in Guangdong and had not spread to
other parts of the country.' 92 As China was uncooperative, the GPHIN alerts
remained particularly valuable-despite Chinese efforts to suppress any
information about the outbreak, GPHIN and GOARN members that relied
on these alerts provided the WHO with timely information to prepare its
response strategy. 193
In March 2003, when the disease reached Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singa-
pore, Canada, and other countries, the WHO issued a "global alert about
cases of atypical pneumonia"' 94 as well as an "emergency travel adviso-
ry."' 95 Simultaneously, in an unusual move, the WHO publicly accused the
Chinese government of underreporting SARS cases and misleading the pub-
lic about SARS's spread. 19 6 These developments forced China to change its
189. See Mykhalovskiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 44. Experts indeed confirmed that the
SARS outbreak started in Foshan, Guangdong Province, in mid-November 2002. See WHO,
SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS): STATUS OF THE OUTBREAK AND LESSONS
FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE 1 (2003), http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars-wha.pdf; see also
Paul Arshagouni, An Introduction to Medical Issues Posed by International Health Threats in
a Legal Framework, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 199, 202 (2004).
190. Mykhalovskiy & Weir, supra note 1, at 44.
191. See John Pomfret & Peter S. Goodman, Mysterious Illness Kills 2 in Beijing in Sign
of Spread, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2003, at A03; Global Alert and Response (GAR): Acute Res-
piratory Syndrome in China, WHO (Feb. 11, 2003), http://www.who.intlcsr/don/2003-
02_ lI/en/.
192. See Pomfret & Goodman, supra note 191 (reporting that Chinese state-controlled
media were not allowed to report on the outbreak). Moreover, Western news media reported
that Chinese officials deliberately hid SARS patients from the WHO personnel investigating
SARS in Beijing. See, e.g., Susan Jakes, Beijing Hoodwinks WHO Inspectors, TIME (Apr. 18,
2003), http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/daily/0,9754,444684,00.html.
193. See Mawudeku & Blench, supra note 161, at i-8 to -9.
194. Press Release, WHO, Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region of China/Viet Nam (Mar. 12, 2003), http://who.int/csr/don/2003_03_12/en/.
195. Press Release, WHO, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)-Multi-
Country Outbreak (Mar. 15, 2003), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003-03 15/en/.
Reportedly, the Asian-Pacific region incurred losses of nearly $40 billion in lost travel
and trade as a result of this. See Tan Ee Lyn, Economic Costs of a Flu Pandemic,
REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/25/us-flu-
costs-factbox-idUSTRE530OWO20090425; see also Charles Piller, In SARS Aftermath,
WHO's in Charge: The Health Monitor's 'Revolutionary' Use of Travel Warnings to Tame
the Outbreak Has Given the Once-Plodding Bureaucracy New Might, L.A. TIMES, July
13, 2003, at Al.
196. John Pomfret, Underreporting, Secrecy Fuel SARS in Beijing, WHO Says, WASH.
POST, Apr. 17, 2003, at A 16.
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course of action. It declared "a nationwide war on the SARS virus"'97 and
took steps to cooperate with the WHO.'98
ii. HINI
HINI influenza (also known as Swine Flu) has been defined as "a high-
ly contagious acute respiratory disease of pigs, caused by one of several
swine influenza A viruses."'199 According to the WHO, Mexican authorities
detected cases of what was later identified as Swine Flu in March 2009.200
HealthMap revealed the first report about "a 'mysterious' influenza-like
illness" in La Gloria, Veracruz, as early as April 1, 2009, when the main-
stream media was still "focusing on the threat of avian influenza originating
in Asia."' ' The initial report stated that nearly "60% of the 3,000 residents"
of La Gloria "had been infected and 2 of them had died since early
March. 20 2 The second report, recorded by the system on April 2, referred to
"the possible role of Granjas-Carroll, a U.S. owned pig farm," in the spread
of the disease. 20
3
The first warning of the unknown disease was sent by GPHIN to the
WHO on April 10, 2009, reporting an "acute respiratory illness in Vera-
cruz." 2°4 The WHO contacted Mexican officials several times in an attempt
to verify the report, but the latter replied that the outbreak had been investi-
gated and all cases proved to be regular influenza.0 5 On April 22, 2009,
197. John Pomfret, China Orders End to SARS Coverup; Officials Begin Belated Cam-
paign Against Disease, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2003, at A08; see also Piller, supra note 195;
John Pomfret, Outbreak Gave China's Hu an Opening; President Responded to Pressure
Inside and Outside Country on SARS, WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at AO1.
198. See Global Alert and Response (GAR): Update 79-Situation in China, WHO (June
12, 2003), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003-06_1 2/en/.
199. Swine Flu Frequently Asked Questions, WHO (Apr. 26, 2009), http://
www.emro.who.int/lebanon/Swine%20Q-A--influenza-26april.pdf.
200. Global Alert and Response (GAR): Influenza-Like Illness in the United States and
Mexico, WHO (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009 04_24/en/index.html. Aside
from this, seven confirmed cases were found in the United States (in California and Texas). Id.
201. Brownstein et al., supra note 153, at 2156. HealthMap picked up the report from a
local Mexican newspaper. Clark Freifeld & John Brownstein, Projects, HEALTHMAP,
http://www.healthmap.org/projects/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); see also Andr~s Timoteo Mo-
rales, Alerta epidemiol6gica en Perote por brote de males respiratorios: Reportan deceso de
tres menores; lugarefios responsabilizan a empresa [Perote Epidemiological Alert for Out-
breaks of Respiratory Disease: Reported Deaths of Three Children; Locals Blame Company],
LA JORNADA (Mex.), Apr. 5, 2009, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2009/04/05/estados/025nlest
(reporting a flu outbreak in La Gloria, Veracruz, as a result of contaminated pig breeding
farms).
202. Brownstein et al., supra note 153, at 2156.
203. Id. This incident was reported by a different Mexican newspaper. See R. Martinez,
Extrahio brote epidemil6gico causa la meurte a dos bebis en Veracruz [Strange Epidemic
Outbreak Kills Two Babies in Veracruz], PROCESO (Mex.), Apr. 3, 2009.
204. Brownstein et al., supra note 153, at 2156.
205. Galaz, supra note 181, at 23.
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however, Mexican authorities independently contacted the WHO to report a
rapidly increasing rate of pneumonia cases. 20 6 In response, the WHO Direc-
tor-General declared that the outbreak constituted a "public health
emergency of international concern" and issued a temporary recommenda-
tion that "all countries intensify surveillance for unusual outbreaks of
influenza-like illness and severe pneumonia." ' 7 Without the availability of
early reports from local Mexican sources, such a recommendation would
probably have had to wait for at least several weeks until the receipt of offi-
cial reports, and thus precious time would have been lost.
HealthMap continued to play a central role in the influenza surveillance
even after reports were picked up by the WHO and various scientific institu-
tions. Among other things, HealthMap offered an interactive map that
tracked the global spread of the influenza,20 8 relying on sources both infor-
mal (such as news media, mailing lists, and contributions from individual
users) and formal (such as announcements of officials from the major health
regulatory institutions). 0 9 The site allowed filtering of reports according to
suspected or confirmed cases of infection or death, and tracking of the geo-
graphic spread of the disease in various intervals of time.2 10 HealthMap
reportedly collected over 87,000 reports from informal and official sources
between April 1 and December 31, 2009.211 These reports were also timelier
than the official ones: the time span between the appearance of the first sus-
pected cases in each country on the map and the official confirmation of
influenza infections had a median of twelve days. 2 12
The examples of SARS and Swine Flu illuminate the extraordinary po-
tential of information technologies to effectively expose and analyze data
regarding state compliance with uncomfortable international obligations.
The tools described above are far from being exhaustive and they do not
necessarily represent the most cutting-edge technology in the field. Howev-
er, their efficacy stems from a powerful fact: they were adopted by an
influential 10 as part of its compliance monitoring routine and yielded bene-
ficial results. This fact deserves the attention of other 1Os.
206. Id. By then, over 850 cases of infection and fifty-nine deaths had already occurred
in Mexico. See Global Alert and Response (GAR): Influenza-Like Illness in the United States
and Mexico, WHO (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en/index.html.
207. Media Centre: Swine Influenza, WHO (Apr. 25, 2009), http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h I n I_20090425/en/index.html.
208. HEALTHMAP, supra note 173.
209. John S. Brownstein et al., Information Technology and Global Surveillance of Cas-
es of 2009 HINI Influenza, 362 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1731, 1731 (2010).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1732. The shortest lag times were observed among countries with a high GDP
per capita, but "there was a wide variation in lag times among less affluent nations." Id.
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While the WHO is so far the only major 10 that regularly relies on in-
formation technologies for compliance monitoring, this should not be the
case. Hence, the following Subsections describe online initiatives that can
be helpful for the purposes of international environmental and human rights
regulation.
2. Environment
As with the international regulation of health, the internet can be used to
improve online compliance monitoring in international environmental regu-
lation. Existing information on the global ecosystem-the state of
freshwater resources, soil productivity, fisheries, and coral reefs-"tends to
be poor and contains serious data gaps."2" 3 Difficulties of analysis and quan-
tification, lack of expert agreement on which indicators should be
monitored, lack of reliable data, and the costs of developing a viable moni-
toring program all pose major challenges for an international compliance
monitoring regime. As described above, the monitoring activities of interna-
tional environmental organizations are currently limited to reports provided
by member states or data that is produced by NGOs.21 4
While international environmental regimes do not yet rely on the inter-
net to buttress their monitoring activities, the potential of information
technologies in the context of environmental regulation is promising. The
early uses of information technologies, discussed below, for compliance
monitoring in domestic settings demonstrate that they can be highly helpful
in revealing violations. Three major methods are available in this respect:
automated web crawlers, distributed monitoring by experts, and participa-
tory platforms for reports by laypersons.
As in the case of international health regulation, web crawlers can col-
lect data -from a variety of information sources, helping to expose
environmental violations and drawing attention to early signs of environ-
mental crises.215 For instance, "[o]nline statistics about a surge in fish prices
in an Asian port ... might hint at wider problems of over-fishing."2 6 Web
crawlers may therefore look for data on unexpected changes in prices or
investments in particular fields. 12 7 Along similar lines, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has been rely-
213. Victor Galaz et al., Can Web Crawlers Revolutionize Ecological Monitoring?, 8
FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 99, 99 (2010).
214. See supra Part I.B.2.
215. See Galaz et al., supra note 213, at 99; see also Alexis Madrigal, Crawling the Web
to Foretell Ecosystem Collapse, Blog Entry for Wired Science, WIRED.COM (Mar. 19, 2009,
3:28 PM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/ecodatamining/ ("By trawling scien-
tific list-serves, Chinese fish market websites, and local news sources, ecologists think they
can use human beings as sensors by mining their communications.").
216. Alister Doyle, Internet Could Become Environmental Watchdog, REUTERS, Mar. 19,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52104120090319.
217. Galaz et al., supra note 213, at 102.
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ing on a web crawler that searches and reports the sales of prohibited organ-
isms over the internet.21 8 Web crawlers may also serve as early warning
systems and signal upcoming environmental shifts. Similarly to the way
GPHIN is used for disease monitoring, web crawlers that are programmed
to search for specific environmental events can bring to the surface poten-
tially helpful information from local newspapers, blogs, discussion groups,
and other sources.
Online compliance monitoring by experts is another option opened up
by information technologies. A digital tool that is particularly promising in
this respect is satellite imagery. Access to high-quality and up-to-date satel-
lite information about particular regions in the world could be highly
effective for international environmental regulation. For instance, satellite
images provided by NASA scientists who studied the Brazilian Amazonia
have already proved helpful when intense forest fires erupted in the re-
gion.219 Relying on real-time satellite imagery coupled with on-the-ground
information, the scientists provided daily email briefings to the Brazilian
authorities, specifying the location and intensity of fires and helping to co-
ordinate and focus the rescue efforts.220 While in this case satellite imagery
was only employed for rescue purposes, it can be similarly helpful to track
deforestation, pollution, or other environmental effects that reflect states'
compliance with international environmental obligations.
The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in
Developing Countries (REDD) framework provides another recent example
of how satellite imagery can overcome difficulties in environmental compli-
ance monitoring. The REDD system offers developing states with
rainforests in their territories financial incentives to protect their forests.221
As many of the targeted states lack either monitoring capacities or proper
incentives to submit accurate information, the reliability of their compliance
reports is likely to be disputed. Hence, the implementation of such a system
requires robust monitoring mechanisms that allow a trustworthy assessment
of forests-both by states and 1Os. In response to this need, Google present-
ed at the International Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009 a
prototype technology that enables online observation and measurement of
changes in forests around the world.222 The technology relies on satellite
imagery available from Google Earth and allows experts (or even
218. Laura A. Meyerson & Jamie K. Reaser, Bioinvasions, Bioterrorism, and Biosecuri-
ty, I FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 307, 312 (2006).
219. Emily Boyd, Navigating Amazonia Under Uncertainty: Past, Present, and Future
Environmental Governance, 363 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B. 1911, 1911 (2008).
220. Id.
22!. For details on the program, see About the UN-REDD Programme, UN-REDD PRO-
GRAMME, http://www.un-redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/tabid/583/Default.aspx (last
visited Oct. 15, 2011).
222. Rebecca Moore, Seeing the Forest Through the Cloud, OFFICIAL GOOGLE.ORG
BLOG (Dec. 10, 2009, 4:59 AM), http://blog.google.org/2009/12/seeing-forest-through-
cloud.html.
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laypersons) to measure levels of deforestation or regeneration of forests over
a period of time.223 Such a tool can be a valuable addition to the monitoring
efforts of the United Nations' REDD Programme.
Observations by laypersons, although not as reliable as expert evalua-
tions, can also be part of the online compliance monitoring game. An early
example in this respect is the electronic mailing list that was used to share
information and compile field observations with regard to mass coral
bleaching during the El Nifio storm in 1997-1998.24 The mailing list al-
lowed a prompt analysis and assessment of the event, with evidence ranging
from "detailed accounts with accurate measures of bleaching and mortality,
to brief anecdotal reports obtained during a rapid site visit. 22 5
Multiple other online monitoring systems have been developed since
then. For instance, "Open Italian Forests" is a participatory platform that
allows individuals to tag on an interactive Google map reports related to
forest fires and preservation in Italy.226 A Russian participatory platform
called "Help Map," operated according to a similar principle, allows indi-
viduals to report forest fires and coordinate assistance and rescue operations
by volunteers. 227 The "Oil Spill Crisis Map" is a U.S.-based project that was
launched after the 2010 British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico
with the purpose of allowing the "citizens of the Gulf Coast ... to speak out
in testimony of ... how the Gulf oil spill is threatening [their] liveli-
hoods. 2 28 As with the Italian and Russian projects, civil society
organizations and individuals may tag on the platform reports and evidence
related to the oil spill, the damage it caused, and the progress of the cleaning
efforts.
CreekWatch is a different type of participatory platform that relies on
reports by laypeople using mobile technology. It is an iPhone application
that encourages users to take photos of polluted water sources in their vi-
cinity and asks them basic questions with regard to the pollution level
(e.g., what is the amount of trash in the water?).22 9 The data is then tagged
223. Id.
224. Linden Wilkinson et al., Ecological and Socioeconomic Impacts of 1998 Coral
Mortality in the Indian Ocean: An ENSO Impact and a Warning of Future Change?, 28 AMINO
188, 189 (1999).
225. Clive Wilkinson, The 1997-1998 Mass Bleaching Event Around the World, in
STATE OF CORAL REEFS OF THE WORLD: 1998, at 15, 18 (Clive Wilkinson ed., 1998).
226. OPEN FORESTE (Italy), http://openforesteitaliane.crowdmap.com/ (last visited Oct.
15,2011).
227. KapTa BOMOMVI35 [HELP MAP] (Russ.), http:llwww.russian-fires.ru (last visited Oct.
15,2011).
228. OIL SPILL CRISIS MAP, http://www.oilspill.labucketbrigade.org/page/index/l (last
visited Oct. 15, 2011).
229. CREEKWATCH, http://creekwatch.researchlabs.ibm.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2011);
see Kerry A. Dolan, IBM Launches iPhone App for Crowdsourcing Water Quality, FORBES




on a map on the CreekWatch website and sent to the relevant water author-
ities.230
While the effectiveness of these experiments varies and none of them is
employed by environmental lOs, they can entail substantial benefits for
monitoring state compliance with environmental obligations. For instance,
satellite imagery can be particularly helpful to track deforestation, pollution,
or other large-scale environmental events. Participatory platforms or net-
works of experts can be valuable in order to unearth smaller-scale
violations, such as trade in endangered species, hazardous wastes, or con-
servation of flora and fauna. lOs should therefore undertake the task and
experiment with the existing tools in order to develop improved models of
online monitoring.
3. Human Rights
Web crawlers, networks of experts, participatory platforms, and other
technological advances for online compliance monitoring have not yet
reached human rights 1Os. This situation is lamentable, as information tech-
nologies can be as useful in tracking violations of human rights as they are
in the field of health. 23 1 Before the internet age, lOs simply did not possess
the means to conduct independent inquiries into the compliance or noncom-
pliance practices of various states.232 Information technologies can help
solve this problem, providing cheap tools for online compliance monitoring.
Moreover, if the goal of human rights lOs is to aggregate information that
will then serve the needs of third-party states, NGOs, and domestic groups,
mechanisms that amplify the amount of available information should be
particularly valuable.2 3
Indeed, some of the existing online initiatives demonstrate the utility of
information technologies for monitoring human rights violations. Currently,
the most famous and successful of these initiatives is a platform dubbed
Ushahidi, meaning "testimony" in Swahili.234 The original platform was
launched to map incidents of post-election violence in Kenya in the begin-
ning of 2008.235 It aggregated reports citizens submitted via the web or
mobile phones regarding violations of human rights, and tagged them on a
230. CREEKWATCH, supra note 229.
231. See, e.g., Molly Beutz Land, Peer Producing Human Rights, 1115 ALTA. L. REV.
(Can.) 46 (2009) (discussing how methods of peer production can be applied to advance fact-
finding by NGOs).
232. See discussion supra Part II.C.
233. Reliance on information technologies for compliance monitoring can also facilitate
the use of quantitative indicators that are currently being developed by U.N. human rights
committees. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (referring to recent scholarship that
discusses such indicators).
234. About Us, USHAHIDI, http://www.ushahidi.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 15,
2011).
235. FAQ, USHAHIDI, http://www.ushahidi.com/about-us/faq (last visited Oct. 15,
2011).
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publicly available Google map.2 36 The platform attracted more than 45,000
users in Kenya and exposed violent events that Kenyan mainstream media
did not report and international media sources were not fully aware of.237
Further, the Kenyan Ushahidi site served as a catalyst for dozens of similar
experiments around the world in fields as diverse as election monitoring in
countries such as Liberia (201 l),238 Brazil (2010),239 Kenya (2010),24o and
Mexico (2009);241 mapping in real time human rights violations during the
recent protests in Egypt;242 mapping violations of human rights in times of
war; 24 3 and more.
Ushahidi-based platforms are only one variation of how information
technologies can be used for monitoring humanfrights abuses. Another re-
cent example includes, among many others, the Cambodian platform Sithi-
a human rights portal that aims to create a single map-based database of
reports on human rights violations with contributions from human rights
activists, organizations, and regular citizens from across the country.244
Largely similar functions are performed by a platform named ALTSEAN in
Burma and a platform titled Kubatana in Zimbabwe. 245 While these experi-
ments are very recent and their degree of effectiveness is at times unclear,
they mark a clear path for experimentation by official human rights 1Os.
The online practices discussed above manifest the capacities of infor-
mation technologies for unearthing and compiling compliance data that
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Liberia 2011, USHAHIDI, http://liberia20l l.ushahidi.com (last visited Oct. 15,
2011).
239. ELEITOR 2010 [VOTER 2010] (Braz.), http://eleitor2OlO.com (last visited Oct. 15,
2011).
240. UCHAGUZI [ELECTIONS] (Kenya), http://uchaguzi.co.ke (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
241. CUlnEMos EL VOTO [WE CARE FOR THE VOTE] (Mex.), http://www.
cuidemoselvoto.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
242. U-SHAHID, http://www.u-shahid.org/cr (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (providing links
to five different interactive maps for the Egyptian elections).
243. War on Gaza, AL JAZEERA, http://labs.aljazeera.net/warongaza/ (last visited Oct.
15,2011).
244. Cambodian Human Rights Portal, SIT.ORG, http://sithi.org/index.php?url=
violation.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). For a description of the project, see Sithi, TECH. FOR
TRANSPARENCY NETWORK (Feb. 5, 2010), http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/
project/sithi.
245. ALTSEAN-BuRMA, http://www.altsean.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); KUBAT-
ANA.NET (Zimb.), http://www.kubatana.net (last updated Oct. 13, 2011). For a description of
the ALTSEAN-Burma project, see Sopheap Chak, ALTSEAN-Burma (Alternative ASEAN




would otherwise be unavailable to 1Os. However, the use of these tools can
also raise difficulties.
The core of these difficulties is that information technologies cannot
produce conclusive results on their own. Should 1Os adopt information
technologies as part of their compliance monitoring efforts, they will have to
thoroughly consider their response to the weaknesses of these tools: What
information is reliable? How should this information be verified? How to-
or even whether to-prioritize reports, even if all of them are reliable?
Which noncompliance incidents should be placed on the organization's
agenda and acted upon, and which reports should be left aside? Answers to
these questions would require 1Os to exercise substantial discretion and
make uneasy decisions. Although information technologies can bring to the
surface otherwise unavailable compliance data, the threat of turning online
compliance monitoring into an information junkyard is real. Even advanced
professional monitoring systems in developed countries suffer from consid-
erable deficiencies.14 6 Online compliance monitoring can "muddy the
waters" even further. Moreover, as illustrated by the WHO recommenda-
tions concerning Swine Flu in Mexico, compliance recommendations from
health-related 1Os can entail immense economic and political costs. 247
Stakes can be similarly high in international environmental and human
rights regulation.
These concerns should not be taken lightly. Hence, the next Part dis-
cusses the broad implications of online compliance monitoring for 1Os,
states, and the international community.
IV. A GLOBAL PANOPTICON?
The newly available information technologies offer an opportunity for
international regulatory regimes: if 1Os fully take advantage of it, the
amount of easily accessible compliance-related information will grow expo-
nentially.
Assuming that compliance monitoring by 1Os indeed helps to strengthen
the effectiveness of international regulatory regimes,248 the value of improved
access to already existing information on state compliance, including state and
NGO reports and 1Os' official documents, is readily apparent.249 1Os should
ensure that their websites are accessible and contain comprehensive and easily
graspable information on state compliance. These steps are relatively cheap,
and their effect can be highly beneficial.
246. See, e.g., Stephen R. Carpenter et al., Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: Research
Needs, 314 SCIENCE 257, 257-58 (2006) (discussing constraints associated with environmen-
tal monitoring).
247. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
248. See discussion supra Part I.B.
249. See discussion supra Part lII.A.
Fall 2011I]
Michigan Journal of International Law
The case for a proactive collection of information is more challenging.
Web crawlers and online participatory platforms of experts and laypersons
may open new and appealing opportunities for online compliance monitor-
ing. However, a pervasive and intrusive monitoring practice may also lead to
a system akin to a "global panopticon." The "panopticon"-a term first in-
troduced by Jeremy Bentham and later developed by Michel Foucault-is
an architectural structure that is used in various spaces (particularly in pris-
ons) as a form of social control and coercion. In its classic design, the
panopticon is a round prison, where individual cells are built into the cir-
cumference of the building around a central well. A warden observes the
cells from an inspection tower that stands in the center, and while the cells
are lighted and transparent, the tower is dark. This creates a situation where
the warden can closely monitor the activities of multiple prisoners. The
prisoners know that they are always visible, but do not know when they are
actually being watched."' This aspect is central to the panoptic structure:
those inside the panopticon "should always feel themselves as if under
inspection, at least as standing a great chance of being so." '' 5 Michel Fou-
cault elaborates this argument, proclaiming that "the major effect of the
Panopticon [is] to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power."252 Comparing the
panopticon to dungeon-like prisons, Foucault argues that the former is
harsher-" [flull lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than
darkness, which ultimately protect[s]. Visibility is a trap. 253
An analogy between 1Os that employ online compliance monitoring
tools and panoptic prisons is of course extreme. But it does help to under-
stand the broad implications of information technologies for compliance
monitoring. The primary "panopticon effect" is that the monitoring 10 can
be seen as a Foucauldian warden-the internet grants it the means to inspect
the compliance of states at its convenience, without their consent or
knowledge. These newly acquired capabilities considerably-but not neces-
sarily desirably-empower 1Os. States are not likely to consent silently to
such a panoptic system, and may take problematic countermeasures in order
to undermine it.
The following Sections examine in further detail the panopticon effect
and discuss its implications.
250. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John
Bowring ed., 1843).
251. Id. at 44.
252. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1995).
253. Id. at 200.
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A. The Panopticon Effect: Empowering 1Os
1Os are frequently criticized for their lack of democratic credentials." 4
The decision-making processes of these bodies, as the argument goes, are
insufficiently transparent and not open to substantial participation by non-
governmental groups and members of civil society. 5 Further, they lack
accountability mechanisms. "[ELven the minimal types of constraints [on
power] found in domestic governments are absent [in IOs]."256 Hence, IOs
are said to be dominated by the narrow interests of the most powerful inter-
national players, "often resulting in inadequate regulatory protection and
economic injustice." '257 The "increased distance from the public . .. and the
lack of democratic foundations for international bodies" therefore "create
serious legitimacy issues.'
258
The exact degree to which these allegations are true and persistent
across 1Os is irrelevant for the purposes of this Article. What is important is
that a pervasive use of information technologies for compliance monitoring
will substantially aggrandize the powers of 1Os. As part of the online com-
pliance monitoring routine, 1Os ought to make two major decisions: what
information to look for, and how the findings should be prioritized. Both of
these decisions require the exercise of considerable discretion.
254. Jose E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
324, 341 (2006); see ALFRED C. AMAN JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT 6 (2004); Robert A.
Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic's View, in DEMOCRACY'S
EDGES 19, 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999); Eric Stein, International
Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 401 (2001). See
generally Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, I CHI. J.
INT'L L. 237 (2000).
255. Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative
Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 63, 71 (referring to "the secre-
cy of international and transnational regulatory decisional processes and the lack of adequate
opportunity for effective access to information, participation and input in global regulatory
decisionmaking").
256. Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 29, 30 (2005). For this purpose, accountability can be defined
as "the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another actor for its
actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or its expla-
nation." Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103
MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005). For a general discussion, see Colin Scott, Accountability in
the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. & Soc'Y 38 (2000).
257. Stewart, supra note 255, at 71; see, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Co-Option and Resistance:
Two Faces of GlobalAdministrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 799, 801 (2005) (argu-
ing that "contemporary international law and institutions have an imperial character: a
transnational capitalist class ... has emerged which shapes international laws and institutions
to its advantage"). For the Third World perspective on international organizations, see also
B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, in THE THIRD
WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION 47-73 (Anthony
Anghie et al. eds., 2003).
258. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Admin-
istrative Law, 1 5 YALE L.J. 1490, 1503 (2006).
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The first requirement is that the 10 must decide what information to
look for. In the large majority of monitoring exercises, 1Os must carefully
frame the search in order to receive intelligible data and avoid information
junkyards. Such a search can never be neutral; the decision of what key-
words to look for inevitably affects the findings.
The second feature is the need for prioritization. The ease of collecting
vast amounts of information inevitably forces the regulator-an 10 in this
case-to decide which information should be dealt with first, which data
should be closely inspected, and which reports should be left aside. Infor-
mation overload, false notices, abundance of details, and other reporting
distortions make the task of analysis and prioritization even more crucial. It
compels the 10 to decide which incidents should be on the public radar and
which violations should be left unnoticed.
These two factors carry considerable distributive effects, especially
when used by politically influential 1Os. In the context of international
health regulation, for instance, the WHO can decide that its monitoring ef-
forts should mostly cover diseases that endanger Western countries (e.g.,
SARS or Swine Flu) and invest fewer resources in monitoring diseases that
plague developing countries (e.g., malaria). Even if the selection of issues to
be monitored is sensible, the prioritization can be problematic. In the con-
text of global health regulation, systems such as GPHIN and HealthMap
routinely unearth large numbers of unverified media sources. The WHO
then ought to assess this data and decide according to its best judgment that
reports trigger further inquiry. Similarly, international environmental secre-
tariats may include as part of their monitoring agenda issues of fisheries
exploitation in developing states, but ignore (or be forced to ignore) oil
spills in politically powerful states. Human rights 1Os may monitor the hu-
man rights record of Iran, but refrain from inspecting reports that flow from
Russia.
As such decisions are currently not transparent and there are no publicly
available criteria or guidance as to how they should be made, improved
monitoring capacities provide 1Os a large leeway for independent agenda
setting. The manner in which this leeway will be used depends on the char-
acter and political circumstances of each 10. The existing power structures
among 1Os are likely to be reinforced here, exacerbating accountability con-
cerns. Thus, politically powerful and independent 1Os will probably attempt
to use their newly acquired capabilities according to their own internal (not
always transparent and sometimes biased) priorities. The monitoring activi-
ties of weak 1Os may become captured by interest groups or fueled to serve
the interests of the most influential member states.2 59
In sum, the use of information technologies for compliance monitoring
purposes is not likely to strengthen by itself the democratic pillars of 1Os.
259. In some cases, capture of weak 1Os by influential member states may prevent them
from engaging in online compliance monitoring whatsoever. While this scenario may be plau-
sible under some circumstances, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Although more compliance-related information may become open and pub-
licly available, and individuals may directly report states' violations,
information technologies empower 1Os and may exacerbate concerns re-
garding their internal administration and decision-making procedures.
B. States' Counterreactions
Given these potentially transformative effects of online compliance
monitoring, states are not likely to silently consent to such new and intrusive
practices. In fact, they are more likely to try to conceal their compliance
data. This can be done in several ways.
1. Disrupting Access
States that seek to avoid online leaks of data may try to block those who
possess this data from having access to the internet. 260 Certain online plat-
forms (e.g., HealthMap) rely heavily on locals to report their personal
experiences. Online networks of experts also depend on information that
flows from people on the ground. Blocking access to such platforms and
networks from the territory of the affected state is likely to weaken their
effectiveness. Without up-to-date and first-hand information, the value of
online compliance monitoring will be diminished and states will regain, at
least to some degree, control over compliance data.
This strategy is far from being new. States routinely seek to control sen-
sitive information within their borders. 261 Empirical studies demonstrate that
internet filtering is a widespread practice, and blocked websites may cover
topics as diverse as free speech, human rights, minority rights, public health,
pornography, dating, gambling, religious criticism, and file sharing. 26 2 New
260. Robert Faris & Nart Villeneuve, Measuring Global Internet Filtering, in ACCESS
DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 5, 9 (Ronald Deibert et
al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter ACCESS DENIED] (noting that "[c]laiming control of the Internet has
become an essential element in any government strategy to rein in dissent-the twenty-first
century parallel to taking over television and radio stations").
261. A recent study of global internet filtering suggests that "[tihe overall trend in Inter-
net filtering is toward more states adopting filtering regimes." Jonathan Zittrain & John
Palfrey, Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanism of Control, in ACCESS DENIED, supra
note 260, at 29, 41. The states with the most extensive filtering practices are primarily located
in eastern Asia, central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. But state-mandated filtering is
not limited to these parts of the world. Filtering occurs in libraries and schools in the United
States, child pornography is filtered in northern Europe, and Nazi paraphernalia and Holocaust
denial sites are blocked in France and Germany. See id.
262. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 260, at 7. In Germany, for instance, websites that
include "propaganda against the democratic constitutional order" are banned. Zittrain & Pal-
frey, supra note 261, at 29, 33 (citation omitted).
As described by Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 260, at 5, 12-18, there is a wide variety
of filtering techniques-IP blocking, DNS tampering (purposefully disrupting DNS servers,
which resolve domain names into IP addresses), and proxy-based filtering (checking the
HTTP address that is accessed against a list of blocked websites or blocked keywords). In
some states, a notice of a blocked page appears if the user attempts to reach a blocked website.
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websites can be added to the filtering systems on an ad hoc basis at any
time.26 3 Blocking websites that allow users to share unflattering information
on state compliance does not present particularly difficult technological
problems.264
While explicit filtering may be effective against participatory platforms
or expert networks, the filters' ability to block web crawlers is limited.265 As
web crawlers operate outside of the state territory, they are not subject to
state filtering. They can therefore unearth compliance information that ap-
pears in local newspapers, blogs, or social networks (e.g., Twitter). Blocking
all these media sources so that compliance data would disappear is hardly
possible. However, states possess more subtle techniques to avoid incrimi-
nating publications that can be caught by sophisticated web crawlers.266 For
instance, states can oblige website owners to register with local authorities
and then revoke their licenses if impermissible information is posted on the
website. 267 Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks can be conducted
without leaving governmental footprints.2 68 Furthermore, instead of restrict-
ing access to information, the state may compete with potential threats
"through effective counter-information campaigns that overwhelm, discred-
it, or demoralize opponents. 2 69 These measures may include information
campaigns that generate noise, 270 attempting to discredit incriminating re-
ports and making it difficult for web crawlers to distinguish between reliable
and unreliable information.
To be sure, such harsh measures are unlikely in mature and functioning
democracies. However, international regulatory regimes cannot rely only on
information provided by transparent democratic regimes. In fact, the most
crucial and urgent compliance data is often possessed by states with exten-
sive filtering policies. The example of SARS is telling in this respect. The
Chinese government is known for its "pervasive" filtering of political issues
Other states attempt to conceal their filtering policies, showing a simple error message if a
blocked website is accessed. See also Steven J. Murdoch & Ross Anderson, Tools and Tech-
nology oflnternet Filtering, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 260, at 57, 57-72.
263. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 260, at 18.
264. For an analysis of the legal frameworks that allow states to engage in filtering activ-
ities, see Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 261, at 32-34.
265. For a discussion of web crawlers in the context of international health regulation,
see the text accompanying supra notes 161-186.
266. See, e.g., Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Control and Subversion in Russian
Cyberspace, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CY-
BERSPACE 15, 22-24 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter ACCESS CONTROLLED].
267. This practice has been employed in some of the Commonwealth of Independent
States. Id. at 25-26.
268. Reportedly, such attacks were carried out by Kyrgyz and Russian governments. Id.
at 26-27.
269. Id. at 27.
270. Id. at 28.
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and "substantial" filtering of social issues. 271 Hence, it was not difficult for
the Chinese government to block the publication of reports related to the
spread of an infectious disease. 72 Effective filtering of such reports on the
local level could prevent international access and successfully hide the exist-
ence of the disease. While these measures proved to be insufficient in the case
of SARS, where information did flow to the WHO, this may only have been a
matter of inadequate technological protections. In other cases, incriminating
information might be better hidden and less accessible. Reports related to
abuses of human rights can be effectively countered by state-sponsored prop-
aganda campaigns that generate noise and make it impossible for 1Os to
screen out false and distorted reports.
Data on noncompliance with international obligations can therefore be
inaccessible or lost in large masses of irrelevant information. Information
junkyards, where everything can be found but nothing makes sense, are a
serious deficiency of the internet even if all parties act in good faith and do
not purposefully distort the information. If political forces intervene and
amplify the natural chaos of the system, its utility for compliance monitor-
ing is likely to be diminished.
2. Hindering the Production of Information
A different defensive measure that states can use to avoid losing control
of negative data is to act preemptively and hinder or prevent the production
of compliance information. This strategy is known in the context of manda-
tory disclosure in private law. Regulatory disclosure requirements may
oblige firms to reveal certain information they possess about a product's
risks. Hence, in order to avoid disclosure of potentially negative infor-
mation, firms are better off not acquiring information about the product in
the first place. 27
3
The application of this logic to the context of compliance with interna-
tional obligations is relatively straightforward. If states can fully control the
information that 1Os observe, they are likely to invest resources in its
271. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA 1 (2009), available at http://
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONlChinaj2009.pdf.
272. For an overview of censorship techniques undertaken by China, see Ethan Zucker-
man, Intermediary Censorship, in ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 266, at 71, 73-74.
273. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven M. Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure
of Product Risks (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W12776, 2006); see,
e.g., Alexander S. P. Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting
the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm, 16 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 189, 189 (2000) (showing that firms tend to conduct fewer "environmental audits" when
regulators, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, use the information unveiled by the
audits as the evidentiary basis for an enforcement action). Along similar lines, Anthony
Kronman notes in the context of contracts law that if the possessor of information "is denied
the benefits of having and using it, he will have an incentive to reduce (or curtail entirely) his
production of such information in the future." Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,
Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-14 (1978).
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acquisition. Assuming that this information does them no harm and will be
used according to their independent discretion, states have an interest in de-
veloping comprehensive and accurate data that will allow them to better
understand their standing vis-a-vis international norms and standards and
better develop appropriate policies. However, if information can reach IOs
without any official filtering, the incentives to acquire it (or facilitate its pro-
duction) will be reduced.
For instance, at the first stages of the Swine Flu outbreak, Mexican au-
thorities insisted that the disease was no more than a normal seasonal flu.
274
The Chinese reaction to the WHO requirements to investigate SARS was
similar. 27 5 Predictably, as the WHO had already started investigating, Mexi-
can and Chinese authorities lacked proper incentives to invest resources in a
thorough investigation of the disease. While the rapid spread of the disease
outside of Mexico and China left their national authorities no choice but to
incur these costs, their first reactions are telling. The fact that a thorough
investigation can reveal incriminating information that would be inevitably
exposed to the international community can serve as a compelling reason to
give up on such investigation. Moreover, if in the past a state could hope that
an early investigation would allow it to solve the problem without the in-
volvement of the international community (so as, for example, to stop SARS
within the borders of China), the speed of information flow in the internet
age changes this reality. States have less time to fix violations without being
noticed and thus have fewer incentives to voluntarily acquire information on
these violations. These considerations are present in the context of environ-
mental or human rights troubles as well.
Similar to the filtering technique, such strategies are less likely to suc-
ceed in mature democracies, where the media and civil society organizations
can more easily demand thorough and transparent investigations and hold
officials accountable. But the majority of states that take part in international
regulatory regimes are not mature democracies. Global infectious diseases
largely originate in developing countries.2 76 Human rights abuses are more
likely in nondemocratic states.2 7 Hence, the efforts of civil society in demo-
cratic and prosperous states cannot suffice to ensure the production of
compliance information in the internet era. Developing or nondemocratic
states can resist attempts to impose undesired norms of transparency on
themselves by hindering the production and acquisition of information.
Ironically, the internet may then reduce the amount of available information,
instead of amplifying it.
274. Galaz, supra note 181, at 23.
275. See discussion supra note 192 and accompanying text.
276. Kate E. Jones et al., Global Trends in Emerging Infectious Diseases, 451 NATURE
990, 991-92 (2008) (analyzing factors related to the emergence of 335 infectious diseases
between 1940 and 2004, and demonstrating that "emerging disease hotspots" are concentrated
in developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia).
277. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill




As discussed above, online compliance monitoring may yield substan-
tial benefits by infusing transparency into previously obscure state practices,
thereby strengthening compliance with international obligations. It can also
reveal crucial information that helps achieve coordinated international solu-
tions, as exemplified by the case of international health regulation. However,
along with these benefits, online compliance monitoring can also empower
1Os and exacerbate existing concerns regarding their internal administration
and democratic nature. States that are not interested in disclosing their com-
pliance status may react adversely, decreasing the amount and the quality of
publicly available information.
The present moment-the dawn of the online monitoring era-is there-
fore crucial. In order to benefit from the potential of information
technologies and reduce their adverse effects, concrete measures should be
taken by the international community and by 1Os. Two strategies can be
helpful in this respect. First, the norms and rules of conduct with respect to
the uses of information technologies for purposes of compliance monitoring
should be negotiated. Second, fragmentation of monitoring bodies should be
encouraged in an attempt to hold 1Os accountable for their compliance-
related policies and decisions. This Section sheds further light on these pro-
posals.
1. Setting Procedures for Online Compliance Monitoring
Due to the "panopticon effect" and its consequences, the contours of in-
ternational transparency policies and compliance monitoring practices
should be negotiated and clearly defined to maximize the advantages and
benefits derived from vast amounts of online information. Such procedures
should define how information should be collected, who should validate it,
and how it should be prioritized.
One can argue that an "over-legalization" of monitoring mechanisms
recreates the compliance difficulties that make online compliance monitor-
ing necessary in the first place. Subjecting 1Os to legal restrictions
developed by self-interested states can return the genie of the internet to the
bottle and retain the status quo of weak compliance monitoring. However, as
demonstrated above, an absence of legal measures and rules framing the
mechanisms of online compliance monitoring may lead to problematic con-
sequences. Nuanced norms of operation that leave enough room for
independent decision making but also impose checks and balances on IOs
therefore seem to be the optimal solution.
The development of such norms is far from being an easy task. A key
component of the monitoring regime is that it operates to the detriment of
some states and to the benefit of others at different times. For example, it is
plausible to assume that while all unaffected states are interested in the early
discovery of an infectious disease, the state where the disease has originated
prefers, by and large, to conceal the information and deal with the problem
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locally.278 However, the affected state in that scenario is likely to join the
ranks of the other countries when a pandemic originates elsewhere. Similar
logic applies to environmental and human rights violations. States are likely
to take turns in terms of their interest in or avoidance of online compliance
monitoring. However, the fact that most states are not likely to have constant
preferences for or against online compliance monitoring does not make
them impartial.
In most cases, states are aware of their comparative vulnerabilities in
advance. Democracies, where larger amounts of information are released to
the public, are more vulnerable to online compliance monitoring than au-
thoritarian regimes. However, the impact of that monitoring is more
threatening to politically weak states, since more powerful states are able to
oppose the pressure of 1Os and the international community. It is easier to
monitor developed states with better internet coverage than developing
states with poor technological infrastructure and low rates of internet access
and connectivity. Since poor, developing states are often incapable of com-
plying with their international obligations even when they want to,
monitoring regimes that rely solely on the internet can miss violations in the
states where they are more likely to occur.279
As states can foresee, at least to some degree, how online compliance
monitoring will affect them, an impartial development of standards is not
likely in this realm. Negotiations under a "veil of uncertainty" that con-
ceals the distributive effects of online monitoring and suppresses the
parties' self-interested behavior are hardly attainable.280 However, these
difficulties do not diminish the need for a normative framework for online
compliance monitoring. Without such a framework, the "panopticon effect"
is likely to persist-online compliance monitoring will overly empower IOs
on the one hand and will be opposed by states on the other hand. The poten-
tial of information technologies for strengthening compliance with
international law will be unfulfilled.
A potential solution to this gridlock is to focus on the legal procedures
for online compliance monitoring, rather than on its substance. Any substan-
tive decision-what information to look for, what data should be prioritized,
and what the 1O should put on its public agenda-is likely to be biased and
278. See discussion supra Part I.A.
279. For this reason, the internet should not be, at least until access becomes globally
widespread, the only monitoring measure. Also, further attention should be given to creative uses
of information technologies in order to take into account the specifics of each state. For example,
in a country with a large coverage of mobile telephone networks (e.g., Kenya) using mobile
phones to convey information can be an effective monitoring strategy. See TECH. FOR
TRANSPARENCY NETWORK, TECHNOLOGY FOR TRANSPARENCY: THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY AND
CITIZEN MEDIA IN PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION 18
(2010), available at http://globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05fTechnology-
forjTransparency.pdf.
280. On the advantages of a "veil of ignorance" for legislative purposes, see, for exam-
ple, ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 31 (2007).
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polarizing. However, decisions related to the procedure-how information
should be collected, and what rules should apply to its prioritization and
interpretation-are more likely to be balanced and consensual.
The aim of these procedures should be to increase the accountability of
1Os to member states and domestic constituencies. 2 ' Clearly, the focus on
procedures cannot fully obviate the influence (or even dominance) of pow-
erful states and the likely battles of conflicting interests. However, given the
inherent power imbalance in international relations, this seems to be the best
available measure. Two guiding concepts should be helpful in this respect.
282
a. Transparent Policymaking
The majority of 1Os do not yet rely on information technologies for
purposes of compliance monitoring, and even pioneer organizations that do
employ these tools lack sound policies with regard to their use. The WHO,
for instance, collects potentially important notices through systems such as
GPHIN and then acts on some of them. It is not known publicly how the
organization decides what information to look for and how it prioritizes the
reports it receives. This opacity may raise concerns of accountability and
trigger negative reactions. The development of transparent policies and
guidelines that specify how online compliance monitoring should be con-
ducted can help to cure this deficiency.
Transparency is crucial in this respect. First, the flow of the decision-
making process should be clear. Situations in which no one knows why the
WHO reacts to some notices that are picked up by its web crawlers but not
to others should be minimized. Further, the policy and-to the extent possi-
ble-the practice of online compliance monitoring should be documented,
publicly available, and open for comments and revisions.283 In developing
this framework, member states are not the only ones that should be invited
to weigh in on the monitoring policies. Participation by NGOs and civil so-
ciety should also be encouraged. Further, in order to ensure the effectiveness
of ongoing monitoring policies, periodic auditing and reviews by independ-
ent third parties (e.g., NGOs or research institutions) should be conducted.
The aim of transparent policy making is akin to the goals of access to
information described above.284 Transparency in itself will not immunize
1Os from undue influences by member states, NGOs, corporations,
281. See Esty, supra note 258, at 1521 (noting that "[w]hen good governance procedures
are employed the decisions that emerge will enjoy a degree of inherent legitimacy"). For ex-
amples of such procedures, see, for example, Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B.
Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 34-35.
282. These suggestions loosely follow the principles developed in Esty, supra note 258,
at 1524-37.
283. Id. at 1527-28 (noting that a procedure of notice and comment provides "a struc-
tured opportunity to gauge rationality, efficacy, clarity, legality, fairness, and efficiency").
284. See discussion supra Part 11.A.
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lobbyists, interest groups, and others. However, as sunlight is known to be
the best "disinfectant,' 28 5 transparent decision-making procedures may
gradually weaken these influences.
b. Due Process
As online compliance monitoring dismantles the states' traditional con-
trol of information and grants substantial discretion to 1Os, these 1Os should
follow basic rules of due process when they decide to act upon this infor-
mation. In the cases of SARS and Swine Flu, the WHO first approached
China and Mexico, respectively, and allowed them to explain the data. This
should indeed be the norm for all endeavors of online compliance monitor-
ing.
Aside from basic fairness, such a structured "right of first hearing" in the
context of online compliance monitoring has several practical advantages. It
can moderate states' adverse reactions to the intrusiveness of online compli-
ance monitoring, thereby fostering cooperative and nonadversarial relations
between states and 1Os. It can also help to achieve efficient local solutions
without costly involvement by the international community. On the other
hand, lack of cooperation on the part of the violating state might give the 10
carte blanche to bring the incriminating information to the world's attention.
Similar to transparent policy making, procedures related to the right of
due process should be thoroughly considered and framed. Importantly, these
procedures should be individually tailored to different scenarios of online
compliance monitoring. While emergencies such as SARS, Swine Flu, or
environmental disasters should require prompt state reactions to 1Os' inquir-
ies, nonemergency reports can be handled differently.
2. Encouraging Fragmentation
A side effect of the rapid development of international regulatory re-
gimes has been the increase of "overlapping jurisdiction and ambiguous
boundaries. '286 The views of legal scholars on this phenomenon differ. Some
view fragmentation as "either an unavoidable minor problem in a rapidly
transforming international system, or even a rather positive demonstration of
the responsiveness of legal imagination to social change. 2 87 Others argue
that fragmentation "operates to sabotage the evolution of a more democratic
285. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1986).
286. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Econo-
my and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 595 (2007).
287. Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmod-
em Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. (Neth.) 553, 575 (2002); see also Jonathan 1. Charney,
The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tri-
bunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697 (1999); Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 809 (1999).
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and egalitarian international regulatory system and to undermine the norma-
tive integrity of international law."
288
In the context of online compliance monitoring, fragmentation plays a
positive role, as it helps to alleviate lOs' accountability concerns. Online
compliance monitoring requires an exercise of discretion as to what infor-
mation should be looked for, how results should be prioritized and analyzed,
and which reports should trigger action on the part of lOs. Division of the
decision-making authority should be welcomed in this respect. Since differ-
ent institutions will answer these questions in distinct manners, the amount
of information and the different angles through which it can be analyzed
will grow. In the case of environmental compliance, for instance, the official
environmental 10 may focus its monitoring efforts on forestry, but nonoffi-
cial NGOs may invest resources in monitoring pollution, hazardous wastes,
and other things. In the context of international health regulation, the WHO
might be captured by specific pharmaceutical companies and hence direct its
monitoring resources to malaria in Africa, for example. The existence of
NGOs that would also use information technologies to demonstrate that
HIV is more prevalent and problematic than malaria in African countries
would not only expose additional useful information but also help to hold
the WHO itself accountable. Currently, the overlapping functions of GPHIN
(the official web crawler used by the WHO), HealthMap (a web crawler de-
veloped by a private research institution) and Google Trends (a private
company that takes advantage of its huge market share to expose unfolding
trends of diseases) generate a seemingly positive balance. Reports that
might have been overlooked, skewed, or deliberately left aside by the WHO
can be exposed by HealthMap or Google Trends, and hence it is easier to
hold the WHO accountable for its decisions and actions.
As the combination of official and nonofficial monitoring bodies both
alleviates the pressure on lOs and helps to hold them accountable, this strat-
egy may function "as a check on self-dealing, analytical errors, and special
interest manipulation of the policy process." '289 While fragmentation of mon-
itoring efforts already exists today, the availability of information
technologies allows even more NGOs and domestic groups to engage in
online compliance monitoring activities, supplementing or challenging the
information provided by the official bodies. Clearly, reports produced by
NGOs should be scrutinized and validated as rigorously as the reports that
are produced by official lOs. But when 1Os and NGOs both engage in online
compliance monitoring efforts they will both share and constrain the role of
the warden in this new Foucauldian "panopticon."
288. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 286, at 597.
289. Esty, supra note 258, at 1534.
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CONCLUSION
The departure point of this Article is that "weak" 1Os, which lack inde-
pendent and stringent enforcement mechanisms, act in the international
arena as information clearinghouses. In this role, they collect data on state
compliance, process it, and disseminate to international and domestic actors
who can then use it for their own needs. While this clearinghouse function is
prevalent among 1Os, many of them fail to perform it due to a variety of
financial and political constraints. This Article argues that information tech-
nologies change this reality.
Focusing on the international regulation of health, environment, and
human rights, and examining numerous online initiatives, this Article
demonstrates that online compliance monitoring reflects a deep conceptual
shift with regard to state compliance with international law. Moving from
policies of information access to proactive compliance monitoring by 1Os,
the Article demonstrates the immense potential of the internet to enhance
the effectiveness of international regulatory regimes. It explains how infor-
mation technologies allowed the WHO to detect, closely follow, and analyze
two global pandemics-SARS and Swine Flu.
Along with celebrating the substantial benefits of online compliance
monitoring, this Article also recognizes the adverse consequences they may
generate. In particular, it argues that online compliance monitoring may cre-
ate a "global panopticon" where states lose control over information and can
always be watched by unaccountable 1Os or NGOs. The Article concludes
with suggestions of how to mitigate the negative aspects of the "panopticon"
while preserving its beneficial effects. While these changes are neither sim-
ple nor easy, the benefits to be gained from online compliance monitoring
make them worth the effort.
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